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Abstract 
AUTOMATICALLY GUILTY: ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN EVIDENCE AND GUILT 
by 
WILLIAM EDWARD CROZIER 
Advisor: Deryn Strange 
Both real-life cases and laboratory research demonstrate that confession evidence is 
very convincing—even when it should not be. Could this be due to an automatic association 
between a confession and guilt? We1 tested this possibility using a Deese-Roediger-
McDermott (DRM) list, which measures automatic associations by presenting participants 
with a list of words that are thematically related but, importantly, lack the word describing 
the theme (“critical lure”). When the association between the list words and the theme is 
sufficiently strong, participants incorrectly report seeing the critical lure. We hypothesized 
that participants would show more false recall for seeing “guilty” on a “guilty”-themed DRM 
list when the list included evidence that is automatically associated with guilt, such as 
“confession” and “DNA.” Although our previous research on this topic found no significant 
effects, we addressed limitations of that research in three studies using an Amazon 
MechanicalTurk sample. Our first study addressed a possible ceiling effect by decreasing 
the associative strength of our “guilty” list. Our second study increased external validity by 
                                                        
1 Because research is a collaborative endeavor, and this project would not have been 
possible without my advisor’s support and contribution, I have chosen to use the pronoun 
“we” throughout my dissertation. I think it is the most accurate characterization of this 
work. 
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presenting our DRM List as a DRM Story—a narrative format that provides context for the 
list words. Our third study investigated the effects of priming evidence quality on the 
association to guilty.  
Overall, we found little support for our hypotheses. Across all three studies, we did 
not detect any effects of the evidence type (Study 1, 2, and 3) or prime type (Study 3). We 
did, however, find several interesting trends in the data. We discuss explanations for the 
lack of significant findings and address directions for future research. Specifically, adapting 
this paradigm for other research applications and to increase our understanding of the 
memorial effects of the “guilty” DRM list.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN EVIDENCE AND GUILT 
 At trial, a particular piece of evidence against a defendant typically suggests, but 
does not determine, guilt. Careful consideration should forge the association between 
evidence and guilt. That is, as a juror reasons through the facts of a case, they should be 
evaluating whether the evidence presented (both individual pieces and the body of 
evidence as a whole) is consistent with the defendant being guilty. But, what if the 
association between evidence and guilt is automatic rather than the result of careful 
decision-making? For example, if a juror simply hears “confession” do they automatically 
think and remember “guilty”? 
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the association between confession and guilt may 
indeed be automatic. In its first 325 DNA exonerations, the Innocence Project found that 88 
of these cases (27%) were due, in part or whole, to a false confession or false admission 
(www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction). Thus, in this group of 
exonerations, someone involved in a criminal investigation—a detective, a district 
attorney, a prosecutor, a judge, a juror, or any combination therein—may have ignored 
potentially exonerating evidence and instead believed the confession. What about the 
confession—a form of evidence prone to error (Kassin et al., 2010)—made it so convincing, 
especially in the cases where there was contradictory DNA? 
 Consider a specific example: the Central Park Five case. On an April night in 1989, a 
female jogger was found brutally beaten and raped in Central Park. Police quickly rounded 
up a group of teenage boys seen roaming the Park earlier in the evening. Of those taken in 
for questioning, five (Yusef Salaam, Kevin Richardson, Antron McCray, Raymond Santana, 
and Korey Wise) confessed to the crime, saying the five of them assaulted the victim alone. 
2 
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Eventually, police compared DNA recovered from a rape kit performed on the jogger to all 
five of the confessors and found no matches (www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-
imprisonment/Korey-Wise). At this point, logic should dictate the teenagers’ confessions 
and descriptions of the crime were all factually inaccurate, and thus the police should 
search for a new perpetrator. Instead, the district attorney charged the five confessors with 
the crime. And at trial, the jury made the same mistake: rather than question the lack of a 
DNA match, they were swayed by the confessions and found all five teenagers guilty.  
 Laboratory research has also demonstrated the power of a confession. Kassin and 
Neumann (1997) found mock jurors are most likely to convict when a confession is 
present, compared to cases with an incriminating eyewitness or an incriminating character 
statement. Furthermore, when mock jurors read a case containing all of these forms of 
evidence, they rated the confession as being the most incriminating. Problematically, 
research has also shown that confessions are persuasive—even when they should not be. 
To test whether a confession impacts a trial decision even if it should be ignored, Kassin 
and Sukel (1997) asked participants to read a trial transcript which contained no 
confession (control), or a confession from a fully-crossed 2(interrogation pressure: low, 
high) x 2(confession: admissible, inadmissible) design. If jurors could indeed ignore an 
improper confession in determining guilt, then only those jurors reading a case with a low-
pressure admissible confession should convict at a higher rate than the no-confession 
control group. This hypothesis is based on the theory that a juror should understand an 
inadmissible confession or a confession produced from a high-pressure interrogation could 
lead to a false confession. Thus, a juror should ignore such a confession in their decision-
making process. Instead, all of the participants who read a case with a confession were 
3 
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more likely to convict than the control group. While the low-pressure admissible 
confession group convicted the most (63% of participants), the low-pressure inadmissible 
(50%) and high-pressure admissible (50%) and high-pressure inadmissible (46%) groups 
were all significantly higher than the no-confession control (19%). Furthermore, 
participants rated admissible confessions and low-pressure confessions as more influential 
in their decision than the inadmissible- or high-pressure-counterparts. Thus, the 
confession continued to affect participants’ decision making even when it should have been 
ignored—and it did so without participants’ conscious awareness. Unfortunately, the 
overriding power of a confession is not just limited to lay people. Recruiting 132 active 
judges, Wallace and Kassin (2012) found that even they were vastly more likely to convict 
if a confession was present— even when the interrogation resulting in the confession was 
described as high-pressure, and despite the fact that the judges rated high-pressure 
confessions as less voluntary. 
 In a recent review of confession and interrogation research, Kassin (2012) 
investigated whether false confessions corrupt the truth-seeking process. He described 
archival data that suggests defendants who confessed are more likely to have a bad defense 
attorney (Kassin & Kukucka, 2012) and are more likely to plead guilty (Redlich, 2010) than 
exonerees who had not confessed. With this body of research in mind, we wondered 
whether it is possible that a confession could also corrupt the truth-finding process at an 
individual, cognitive level. Perhaps the reason an improper confession is so difficult to 
exclude from a juror’s guilt decision-making process is because a confession suggests guilt 
so strongly that the confession is automatically and unconsciously associated with guilt — 
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and that automatic association is all but impossible to break. That is the proposition we 
address in this set of studies. 
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CHAPTER 2: TESTING FOR AUTOMATIC ASSOCIATIONS 
The Implicit Associations Test 
When psychologists want to measure automatic associations, perhaps the most 
prominent paradigm that comes to mind is the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). As its name implies, the IAT measures implicit associations by 
measuring how long it takes participants to categorize specific stimuli (i.e., African 
American names) into a proper category (Black names or White names) that is 
simultaneously paired with a seemingly unrelated category (Pleasant or Unpleasant). 
When participants take longer to categorize the stimuli into one classification (an African 
American name into the Black/Pleasant category) than another (African American names 
into the Black/Unpleasant category) they are said to have a preference for the shorter-
response group. Although the IAT has been an incredibly fruitful paradigm, measuring a 
multitude of implicit attitudes and associations—such as race (Greenwald et al., 1998), 
gender (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003), voter behavior (Arcuri, Castelli, Galdi, 
Zogmaister, & Amadori, 2008), attitudes towards alcohol (Houben & Wiers, 2006) and 
smoking (Huijding, de Jong, Wiers, & Verkooijen, 2005), consumer behavior (Maison, 
Greenwald, & Bruin, 2004), gender and math (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002), and even 
as a questionably-effective  tool to detect false memories (Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, 
Ferrerra, & Castiello, 2008; but see Takarangi & Strange, 2013)—we do not believe it is the 
best paradigm to test our question. The IAT has several theoretical problems and 
implication limitations that render it unsuitable for this research project. For example, 
although the IAT does reliably produce a difference in response times, it is still a matter of 
debate as to what that difference means. Indeed, Blanton and Jaccard (2006) refer to the 
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IAT as arbitrary, because it relies on (among other issues), millisecond metrics to measure 
bias, norming, and arbitrary zero points such that understanding differences in results 
requires a certain amount of interpretation. Moreover, Fiedler, Messner, and Bluemke 
(2006) found that the association model underpinning the IAT is questionable and, perhaps 
most relevant to this project, differences in IAT scores between individuals are ambiguous 
and hard to interpret (e.g., arbitrary zero points).  These issues lead to a number of 
practical problems for this particular project. First, the IAT paradigm would be extremely 
difficult to modify. The IAT measures response times between two general concepts, such 
as “violent” and a racial group, averaged over many trials. The necessity of many repeated 
trials means that participants must view and respond to multiple iterations of the 
concept/association pairings—for example, twenty different photographs of African 
American males paired with ten “pleasant” and ten “unpleasant” stimuli. Because “guilty” is 
a specific concept that would be difficult to uniquely represent several times over, the IAT 
would be extremely difficult to adapt here; showing twenty African-American photographs 
is far easier than representing “guilty” in twenty different ways. Furthermore, it would 
require an extraordinarily large number of trials to compare guilty to different forms of 
evidence (such as confessions, DNA, etc.) to detect automatic associations. Second, the IAT 
would prove difficult to modify for follow-up studies as it is built in a very specific way and 
offers little flexibility in its construction and measurement. Finally, and perhaps most 
critical to our purposes, the IAT does not address memory. Although the IAT measures 
implicit associations, a paradigm that could also measure how people apply that 
association in a more directly-observable manner, would be much more useful. 
 
7 
AUTOMATICALLY GUILTY 
 
The Deese-Roediger-McDermott Paradigm 
The Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995) provides a novel way of testing potentially automatic associations in a 
legal context. Not only is it a much easier and more adaptable paradigm to implement (see 
below for its variety of research applications), it also relies on existing semantic knowledge 
networks and allows us to directly measure how people relate specific concepts through 
false recall formation. As such, we can observe how people relate certain forms of evidence 
to “guilty” as well as gain insight into how the resulting false memories may influence 
future decisions and judgments. 
The methodology for the DRM paradigm is straightforward: participants view or 
hear a list of words that are related to a concept, or theme. However, the theme itself is not 
included in the list. This strongly-related, excluded word is referred to as the “critical lure.” 
For example, participants read: rest, doze, snore bed…, but not the critical lure “sleep.” 
Then, after a short delay to allow the list to pass out of short-term memory, researchers 
test participants’ memory for the list items, either by a) asking participants to recall all of 
the words they can remember in two minutes, or b) a recognition task for list words, new 
words, and the critical lure wherein participants rate whether a word is “Old” or “New,” 
and rate their confidence in their response.  Furthermore, if “Old” is selected, participants 
categorize their memory as either a “remember” judgment (strong, vivid memory with 
specific details), a “know” memory (a general sense of familiarity), or a “guess” judgment.  
Research shows that participants will report having seen the critical lure, for a 
variety of list-themes, ranging from 27% (the king list) to 80% (sleep list) of the time on the 
recognition test (Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1995). The phenomenological aspects of 
8 
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the falsely recalled lure can also be similar to those for list words. For example, Read 
(1996) used the sleep DRM list and found that participants were just as likely to report 
having seen “sleep” on the list as they were any of the words actually presented. Overall, 
participants reported significantly different confidence ratings and “remember” judgments 
(signifying clear, strong memories) for the “sleep” critical lure and the list words. However, 
when participants estimated that the critical lure appeared in the first third of the list 
(compared to those that estimated the middle third or last third), confidence ratings and 
“remember” judgments were nearly identical for the critical lure and the list words. 
Activation-Monitoring Theory  
How does the DRM paradigm create such robust false recall? According to the 
activation-monitoring theory, people falsely recall the critical lure due to a combination of 
activating the concept, followed by committing a source monitoring error (Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995; Roediger & McDermott, 2000; Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001). As a 
person reads the list words, the topic to which they are all related is “activated” by one of 
two processes. According to the spreading activation account, the semantically-related list 
words cue the semantic network to which the critical lure belongs (Collins & Loftus, 1975). 
Subsequently, the critical lure is activated: Either the reader consciously thinks of the 
critical lure, as in “all of these words remind me of sleep” or without awareness, by which 
the reader thinks of the concept of sleep without realizing it. Alternatively, fuzzy-trace 
theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998) explains that as a person reads the list, they construct a 
gist representation of the list, which describes the properties and features common to all of 
the list words. The critical lure is also activated because it shares many of these features 
9 
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with the gist trace. However, as Gallo (2010) points out, these two processes are extremely 
similar, not mutually exclusive, and amount to the same end: activation of the critical lure. 
Next, at test, the person must engage in a source monitoring decision to determine 
the source of the activated critical lure (e.g., sleep; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; 
Lindsay, 2008). When attempting to determine whether they have seen a specific word on 
the preceding list, people must access their memory for the list itself. When a word is not 
related to the list topic and was therefore not on the list (such as “lawyer” for the sleep list) 
it is easy to reject. However, when evaluating the source of the critical lure, which has been 
previously activated, a person must choose between an internal source (thinking about the 
word) and an external source (reading the word). When they falsely remember seeing the 
critical lure, they have committed a source monitoring error; they attribute their thinking 
of the critical lure to reading the word on the list. 
 At its heart, the DRM paradigm is a memory test. However, it relies on the strength 
of the semantic relationship between a critical lure and a topic — the stronger the 
relationship, the higher the false recall (or recognition) rate for the critical lure. Put 
another way, if the list words are sufficiently semantically related to the critical lure, that 
list will produce false recall. If, however, the list words do not relate to the critical lure, the 
list will fail to activate the network and participants will be less likely to falsely recall the 
word. Indeed, research has found a positive correlation between the associative strength of 
the list words to the critical lure, and the false recall of the critical lure: the more strongly 
associated the list, the more likely you are to see the DRM effect (Gallo, 2010; Roediger et 
al, 2001; Deese, 1959).  
10 
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The DRM paradigm has been adapted in a number of ways to study memory more 
broadly, such as providing support for a dual-process memory model (Barnhardt, Choi, 
Gerkens, & Smith, 2006), studying development of memory in children (Metzger et al., 
2008), memory in Alzheimer’s patients (Balota et al., 1999; Watson, Balota, & Sergent-
Marshall, 2001), memory in PTSD patients (Brennen, Dybdahl, & Kapidzic, 2006; 
Hauschildt, Peters, Jelinek, & Moritz, 2012), and even measuring individual differences for 
false memory susceptibility (Blair, Lenton, & Hastie, 2002) — not to mention increasing 
our understanding of general true and false memory processes and how those processes 
develop (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Roeidger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001; 
Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004; Barnhardt, Choi, Gerkens, & Smith, 2006; Brainerd, Yang, 
Reyna, Howe, & Mills, 2008; Sugrue, Strange, & Hayne, 2009). 
Using the DRM to Measure Automatic Semantic Associations 
The DRM paradigm can also be used to measure the semantic relationship between 
a list of words and the central concept due to its reliance on spreading activation within a 
semantic network. The more often a DRM list generates false recall for the critical lure, the 
greater the association between the lure and activated concept. If any alterations are made 
to the list words, any increase (or decrease) in the critical lure false recall rate is due to that 
alteration strengthening (or weakening) the semantic association. Similarly, any primes or 
stereotypes that activate related networks can also influence how often people false alarm 
to the critical lure. For example, Lenton, Blair, and Hastie (2001) found that participants 
were more likely to false alarm to a stereotypical male job or trait (i.e., engineer and wise) 
when viewing a list constructed of other stereotypical male jobs than when viewing a list of 
stereotypical female jobs. However, when viewing the stereotypical female jobs list, 
11 
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participants false alarmed to female jobs and traits (dancer and delicate) more than 
stereotypical-male roles and traits. Furthermore, when participants were primed with a list 
of either male traits or female traits before viewing the male-job or female-job list, they 
showed greater false alarm rates when viewing the gender-associated list.  
Takarangi, Polaschek, Hignett, and Garry (2007) also demonstrated that priming 
and individual differences can affect how we interpret a DRM list. In their study, when 
participants were shown an ambiguous list (words such as beat, batter, punch, etc. that 
could either be violent words or kitchen/food words), those who were primed to be more 
hostile, or were high in trait hostility, false alarmed to more non-ambiguous violent words 
(e.g., stab) than those low in state or trait hostility. Takarangi et al. explained that this 
higher false alarm rate was likely due to the strength of the violent-interpretation network 
being activated. Those who were more hostile were more likely to see the ambiguous list 
words in a hostile, violent way, and thus activated the unambiguously-violent critical lure. 
Therefore, because we know priming specific information can influence the semantic 
activation that leads to a DRM false alarm, we reasoned that it may be a useful tool to 
employ in the proposed studies. More specifically, could we introduce information about 
legitimate or wrongful convictions hinging on specific evidence via priming to strengthen 
or weaken that evidences’ association with guilt?  
 Because the associative strength of the list correlates with the critical lure, we 
should be able to use a DRM list to measure the associative relationship between different 
forms of evidence (the words on the list) and “guilty” as a critical lure. By creating a DRM 
list for the critical lure “guilty” and including different forms of evidence in the list, we 
should be able to use the rate of false recall for “guilty” to measure how closely each form of 
12 
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evidence is associated with “guilty.” That is, if a piece of evidence, such as “confession,” is 
automatically strongly associated with guilty, then the semantic activation would be 
stronger than the basic list, thereby increasing false recall for the critical lure. Conversely, if 
a form of evidence is more weakly associated with guilty, the semantic activation would 
decrease compared to the basic list, and thereby generate less false recall. 
 Although confessions are an obvious candidate for evidence that might be 
automatically associated with guilt, there are certainly others. We suspect that evidence 
that is generally perceived to be highly reliable and highly accurate will be more likely to 
lead to a guilty verdict, and thus more strongly associated with guilt; the weaker the 
perception of the evidence, the weaker the association should be. For example, DNA is a 
form of evidence that we expect would be strongly associated with guilt, given that it has 
been scientifically developed and validated as reliable and accurate (albeit, not entirely free 
of error; Lieberman, Carrell, Miethe, & Krauss, 2008; National Academy of Sciences, 2009). 
Indeed, Lawson (2014) found that participants rated DNA evidence as being highly reliable 
(4.75 on a 1-5 Likert Scale). Importantly, participants rated DNA as more reliable than 
other forms of forensic evidence, including fingerprints (reliability = 4.33), bitemarks 
(3.89), toolmarks (3.58), and eyewitnesses (2.84) — a finding supported by Lieberman et 
al., (2008) and Hans, Kaye, Dann, Farley, and Albertson, (2011). Together, these ratings 
offer comparative forms of evidence for testing guilt associations. For example, eyewitness 
evidence is viewed as less reliable, likely because it is not scientific and is prone to error 
(National Academy of Sciences, 2014; Wells et al., 1998). As such, eyewitness evidence 
should be weakly associated with guilty and a good comparison for confessions which are 
similarly not the result of scientific analysis. On the other hand, fingerprint analysis is 
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similar to DNA in that it is scientific and perceived as fairly reliable, but, unlike DNA, not 
scientifically validated and thus more prone to error (National Academy of Sciences, 2009). 
Therefore, fingerprints should be associated with guilt, but not to the same extent as DNA. 
Likewise, bitemark analysis, despite its reputation, is not scientific, not validated, and 
prone to error (National Academy of Sciences, 2014) and has been the subject of significant 
negative media attention (Balko, 2015a, 2015b). Thus it should be weakly associated with 
guilt. Together, these forms of evidence represent a possible spectrum of guilt association, 
ranging from DNA (strong) to eyewitness (weak).  
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CHAPTER 3: DEVELOPING AND TESTING A “GUILTY” DRM LIST 
In our initial tests employing the DRM paradigm to measure associations between 
guilt and evidence, we successfully created a 14-word “Guilty” DRM list. We had 60 
participants from Amazon MechanicalTurk (MTurk) complete a forward associative task 
for the word “guilty.” They listed the first 10 words that came to mind when they read 
“guilty.” From these data, we chose the 14 most commonly reported words (excluding 
vague words, such as “bad;” See Appendix A)—which ranged from being listed 47% of the 
time (“jury”) to 10% of the time (“verdict” and “sentence”)—and tested whether a short (7 
words) or long (14 words) list produced false recall of “guilty.” Forty-five participants read 
the list of words (presented for 1.5 seconds each), completed a 5-minute interference task, 
then completed an OLD or NEW recognition test and rated their confidence in each decision 
(1=not at all confident, 5=very confident). Participants were assigned to the 7-word list 
(N=20) or a 15-word list condition (N=25). All read the “sleep” list, the “chair” list 
(established DRM lists that we used as control comparisons) and the “guilty” list. We found 
that the word “guilty” was falsely recalled about 70% of the time, regardless of the list 
length (M7-word=.70; M14-word=.71), which is in line with our DRM control lists; “sleep” was 
falsely recalled 89% of the time (M7-word=.90; M14-word=.88); “chair” was falsely recalled 79% 
of the time (M7-word=.85; M14-word=.75). Thus, our “guilty” list reliably produced a high rate 
of false recall. 
 With a functioning “Guilty” DRM list, we then tested our primary research question: 
are different forms of evidence more strongly associated with guilt than others? To do so, 
we removed the last word (which is also the most weakly-associated word) and placed one 
of four types of evidence into the 7th position in the list, creating four new lists to test 
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between subjects. These forms of evidence were: “confession,” “DNA,” “bitemark,” and 
“eyewitness.” Participants were sorted into one of five conditions: a Control List condition, 
which read the basic “guilty” DRM list; a Confession List condition, which read the list 
containing “confession” as the 7th word; a DNA List condition; a Bitemark List condition; 
and finally an Eyewitness List condition. Based on the convincing nature of confession 
evidence (see Chapter 1), we hypothesized that participants in the Confession List 
condition would show significantly more false recall than all of the other conditions, save 
the DNA List condition. We further hypothesized that participants in the DNA List condition 
would show an increased false recall occurrence, similar to those in the Confession List 
condition, due to the fact that DNA evidence is scientifically reliable and widely used in 
court (National Academy of Sciences, 2009). Conversely, we expected the Bitemark List 
condition (evidence that is regarded as “scientific” but is not accepted by the National 
Academy of Sciences as reliable; National Academy of Sciences, 2009; Garrett & Neufeld, 
2009) and the Eyewitness List condition (evidence that is prone to error and not regarded 
as scientific; National Academy of Sciences, 2014; Wells et al., 1998) to show fewer false 
recall for “guilty” than our strong-evidence conditions. 
 We recruited 699 participants from MTurk across three samples and assigned them 
to one of the five conditions (Control List N=146; Confession List N=151; DNA List N=159; 
Bitemark List N=148; and Eyewitness List N=95, smaller because we did not include it in 
our first sample). Surprisingly, we found no significant differences between groups (X2(4, 
N=699)=4.59, p=.332; all pair-wise comparisons between groups were not significant, 
p>.05). However, we did find that participants reported reading "guilty” at consistently 
high rates: MControl=0.73, 95%CI=[0.68,0.82]; MConfession=0.82, 95%CI=[0.75,0.88]; 
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MDNA=0.82, 95%CI=[0.76,0.87]; MBitemark=0.85, 95%CI=[0.79,0.90]; MEyewitness=0.78, 
95%CI=[0.69,0.86]. Moreover, a one-way ANOVA on people’s confidence ratings for 
reading “guilty” revealed that although the overall test was not significant (p>.05), 
participants in the Confession List group were more confident in their false recall of “guilty” 
than those in the Control List group (t(132)=1.98, p=.049, d=0.258; MConfession=4.35, 
95%CI=[4.20,4.45]; MControl=4.11, 95%CI=[3.92,4.30]) and DNA List group (t(152)=2.24, 
p=.026, d=0.283; MConfession=4.35, 95%CI=[4.20,4.45]; MDNA=4.09, 95%CI=[3.92,4.26]).  
 Based on these data, we can conclude two things. First, manipulating the list to 
include specific forms of evidence did not seem to change the list’s activation strength of 
guilty. However, our results do seem to show an interesting trend. The lists containing 
evidence forms did generate more false alarms to “guilty” than the control list. 
Interestingly, the Eyewitness List did not generate as much false recall as the other evidence 
lists, likely due to its perceived weakness as a type of evidence (Lieberman, et al. 2008; 
Hans et al., 2011). The Bitemark List, however, produced high rates of false recall—rates in 
line with the Confession and DNA lists—which may be due to a lack of knowledge regarding 
the unreliability of bitemark evidence (National Academy of Sciences, 2009; Lawson, 
2014). Second, although the types of evidence are not affecting how likely participants are 
to false alarm to guilty, there is some evidence that the variations in evidence may be 
affecting the phenomenological experience of the list. That is, people who read the 
Confession List were more confident that they saw guilty than participants who saw other 
forms of evidence. Despite the small effect size of these differences, we take this as 
evidence that there is some connection between confession and guilty compared to other 
forms of evidence. 
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 Another reason to warrant further investigation with the “guilty” DRM list lies in the 
list’s pragmatic implication. As reviewed in Chapter 2, the DRM effect occurs when people 
(intentionally or unintentionally) connect all of the list words and semantically activate the 
theme—the critical lure. Our DRM list certainly seems to operate according to this 
mechanism. However, a body of research beyond the DRM paradigm provides insight into 
the false recall created by the “guilty” list. Work on pragmatic implication has 
demonstrated people can falsely remember implied, but not stated, ideas. Although this 
work has studied paragraph stimuli rather than lists, a similar mechanism may apply here. 
The criminal justice words on our list, such as “judge,” “jury,” “crime,” and “trial,” may 
pragmatically imply guilt causing people to falsely remember that implication as being a 
part of what they saw. Indeed, Bransford and Johnson (1971) found that participants 
would remember more information than was originally stated, or misattribute the source 
of that information, as a result of integrating the content of topically-related sentences. 
 Chan and McDermott (2006) note that the pragmatic implications of a message 
necessarily change the meaning of the original message. For example, participants who 
read “The baby stayed awake all night” later false alarmed to “The baby cried all night” 
65% of the time. Of course, while babies do stay awake crying, they could be awake for a 
number of other reasons that do not require an upset infant. Further, they found that when 
a message was strongly implied—but not outright stated—participants remembered that 
message just as strongly as presented information. The implication here is that even 
though our list words should be guilt-neutral, people understand them to imply guilt. 
Indeed, such automatic association underlines the importance of further understanding 
this process. People should be innocent until proven guilty—not automatically guilty. For 
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example, innocent and guilty people go before a judge, a jury, and have a trial. Further, the 
word “innocent” —the opposite of guilty—appears on the list. However, these words 
activate the justice system—a fixture of society that is both unique and familiar. Because 
the justice system’s courts are specifically designed to assess guilt, the unavoidable 
activation of guilt adds an additional level to the DRM semantic activation. 
 Given the mixed results from our previous work and the contextual richness of the 
concept of “guilty,” we designed a series of studies to further explore the usefulness of the 
DRM paradigm in detecting automatic associations between evidence and guilt. 
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CHAPTER 4: PROPOSED RESEARCH PLAN 
Although our hypotheses were not generally supported in our preliminary work, the 
small effect we observed for Confession List confidence suggested this paradigm may still 
be useful. Indeed, there are at least two limitations we need to address. First, we suspected 
there may be a ceiling effect for our “guilty” DRM list. The Control List generates false recall 
for “guilty” in 73% of participants; a rate that places it with some of the most successful 
DRM lists in lure activation. Although not statistically different from Control, we see that 
the Confession List and the DNA List appeared to generate slightly higher rates of false 
recall (82% of participants for both lists). Although it may be that there is no difference in 
associative strength between the three lists and “guilty,” another explanation is plausible: 
the Control List association is already so strong that the addition of even more strongly 
associated words (“confession” and “DNA”) does little to increase the association. 
Therefore, we addressed this possible ceiling effect in two ways. First, a shorter list could 
create a situation in which removal of the last word (the 7th word, compared to the 14th 
word in our previous study) would decrease the associative strength of the list more than 
our current 14-word list. Second, it is possible that some of our words were so strongly 
associated with guilt (the words at the beginning of the list) that the latter words did little 
to increase the association. Therefore, it may be possible to address the ceiling effect by 
using words that are more weakly associated with guilty, which would make the variations 
in guilt association between evidence types more detectable. Thus, a shorter list with more 
weakly associated words would be more sensitive to the associative strength of a single list 
word, thereby amplifying the associative strength of our evidence types. We test this 
hypothesis in Study 1. 
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 A second important limitation to our prior work is the lack of context. Given the 
applied nature of our research question, we cannot ignore the possibility that situational 
context and previous knowledge would play a role in how a real juror would associate 
evidence with guilt. Reading a list of 7 or 14 criminal justice words is a far cry from an 
actual trial. Interestingly, Dewhurst, Pursglove, and Lewis (2007) demonstrated the DRM 
effect with a paragraph, rather than a list. The paragraph—termed a “DRM story”—placed 
the 14 list words in a narrative of 65-104 words, depending on the list. They developed this 
method to test children’s automatic associations. Children do not tend to show the DRM 
effect because they typically fail to make the semantic association between the list words 
(Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, 2002). The DRM story provides context for the list words and 
makes the semantic association easier for the children to detect. As a result, they are more 
likely to generate the critical lure than the original list approach. We adapted this “DRM 
Story” paradigm to our “guilty list” to create a more context-rich situation. Thus, we 
hypothesized that the increased context provided by the “DRM Story” would amplify the 
automatic association between “guilt” and strong evidence forms. We tested a “guilty” DRM 
Story format in Study 2. 
 Another important consideration regarding the issue of context is what people come 
into the study knowing about each form of evidence. So far, we have relied on participants’ 
existing knowledge-base. However, in a real case, the quality of the evidence plays a large 
role in how guilt is determined—good evidence (correctly gathered and analyzed) is far 
more likely to lead to a guilty verdict than bad evidence. Indeed, the quality of evidence 
(both general and for a specific piece of evidence in a specific case) is the type of contextual 
information that would be discussed in an actual case. Evidence quality information is also 
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akin to another real-world form of context—pretrial publicity (Studebaker & Penrod, 
1997). Trial-relevant information learned outside of the courtroom (e.g., through media 
reports) can affect a variety of case-relevant judgments, such as defendant credibility and 
guilt ratings. Such effects are the result of a source monitoring error, in which people 
mistake what they learned pre-trial (which should be excluded from a juror’s consideration 
of the case) for being learned during the trial itself (Ruva & McEvoy, 2008). This is 
problematic for the chances of a fair trial, as only information learned during the trial is 
subject to the rules of evidence and should therefore be the only information used when 
determining a verdict. Although this project is not looking at pretrial publicity’s per se, 
there are clear parallels. Whereas pretrial publicity context provides additional case “facts,” 
priming evidence as should strengthen or weaken the relationship between evidence and 
guilt, thereby altering how people think about guilt. 
As such, in Study 3 we addressed whether pre-list priming—to frame the quality of 
the evidence in the DRM list —strengthens or weakens the association between the 
evidence and guilt. 
Data Analysis Approach 
Because we are using the DRM to measure semantic activation, we are primarily 
interested in the differences between Evidence List groups. Thus, for the three studies we 
will report the free recall, recognition, confidence, and Remember/Know/Guess results in 
the main body. Other statistics of interest, but not experimental focus, are included in the 
Appendices. For example, the memory measures for old words, new words, and the weak 
lure for the “guilty” list and comparison DRM lists (“chair” for Study 1; “sleep” for Study 2) 
are included in the Supplementary Statistics Appendices for the respective studies. 
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Across all three experiments, Free Recall and Recognition Test results are submitted 
to ANOVAs.  Because these measures are dichotomous (e.g., “old” or “new”), these data are 
traditionally submitted to chi-square analyses. We chose to report ANOVAs and t-tests for 
two reasons. First, chi-square analyses yield the same significance values as ANOVAs and t-
tests. To this point, we analyzed our data both ways and include the chi-square results in 
the Appendices for the respective study. Second, ANOVAs and t-tests are not entirely 
inappropriate statistical tests, as we are attempting to compare the rates of false alarms per 
group—which is a continuous variable. Indeed, we find that ANOVA results and effect sizes 
are more intuitively understood than chi-square results and effect sizes. 
 
  
23 
AUTOMATICALLY GUILTY 
 
CHAPTER 5: STUDY 1 – THE 7-WORD LIST 
An alternate explanation of our original findings is that our Guilty list was so strong 
that we observed a ceiling effect in the rate of critical lure false recall. The goal of this study 
was to test the automatic associations between evidence and guilt with a control list that is 
more weakly associated with “guilty.” To accomplish this, we decreased the list from a 14-
word list to a 7-word list and address the question: Do some forms of evidence show 
greater automatic associations with guilt than others in a 7-word list? Traditionally, a DRM 
list presents words in order of decreasing association: thus, the strongest-associated word 
is presented first, and the weakest-associated word is presented last (Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995; Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1999). However, because it was our 
goal to decrease the associative strength of our list, including the most strongly-associated 
words may not be the best strategy. Therefore, which words we ultimately include in our 7-
word list is as important a consideration as the length of the list. We hypothesized that 
shortening the list to 7-words by removing the three most strongly associated-words and 
the 4 most weakly-associated words, false alarm rates to the critical lure will decrease 
(Study 1a). Then, using this new 7-word list, we hypothesized participants in a Confession 
List and DNA List condition would false alarm to the critical lure more than participants in 
the Control List, Fingerprint List, and Eyewitness List conditions (Study 1b). 
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CHAPTER 6: STUDY 1A  
Design: 
 Between-subjects 3 group design (Relative Forward Associative Strength of the 
Words: Words 1-7, strong association: 47%-24%; Words 4-10, medium association, 39%-
17%; Words 7-14, low association, 24%-10%; see Appendix A for List Words and their 
Forward Associative Strength, and Appendix C for the word compositions of the lists). 
Because the results of our first sample were surprising, we gathered a second sample to 
replicate the findings. In this second sample, we included a fourth word list (a Medium-
Strong Association list, comprised of words 2-8, 44%-24% BAS), creating a 4 group design 
(BAS of words: Strong Association; Medium-Strong Association; Medium Association; Weak 
Association). 
Participants: 
Sample 1. We recruited 201 MTurk workers. Of these, we excluded 53 for failing to 
follow directions (e.g., taking notes, engaging in another task, watching the word list (which 
plays as a movie) more than once) and/or technical issues (e.g., the list failing to load, 
Qualtrics crashing). For full exclusion criteria, see Appendix B. Thus, our final sample 
included data from 148 participants (52 saw the Strong Association list; 44 the Medium 
Association list; 52 the Weak Association list; imbalance due to exclusions). Participants 
were 96 female, 52 male, with an average age of 37.38 (SD=11.19). English was the primary 
language of all participants. Twenty-six held graduate degrees, 68 college degrees, and 54 
high school diplomas. 
Sample 2. We collected 251 MTurk workers. Of these, 50 were excluded, leaving 201 
in our final analysis (46 Strong Association list; 52 Medium-Strong Association list; 53 
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Medium Association list; 50 Weak Association list). Participants were 137 female, 64 male, 
with an average age of 37.93 (SD=11.68). English was the primary language of all 
participants. Twenty of the participants held graduate degrees, 90 a college degree, and 91 
a high school diploma.  
We hypothesized that weakening the associative strength of the list would have a 
medium-sized effect on false alarm rates (d=0.5). Thus, we needed approximately 50 
participants per cell to detect differences in the critical lure false alarm rate between lists 
with 80% power and alpha=0.05. 
Materials: 
DRM Lists. Participants saw two 7-word DRM lists in a video: The “chair” list and the 
“guilty” list, manipulated for forward associative strength (see Appendix A). Because the 
“chair” list seemed to have rates comparable to our “guilty” list in pilot testing, we chose to 
use this as a DRM memory control. We excluded the “sleep” list (that we have used in past 
studies) because the false alarm rate is extremely high (and thus a weaker control than the 
“chair” list) and a second control DRM list adds unnecessary time to the experiment.  
The four lists we used (3 in Sample 1, all 4 in Sample 2) were derived from our 
previous development of the “guilty” DRM list. The lists contained seven words from our 
previous 14-word list. For a list of the word lists used in Study 1a, see Appendix C. For the 
instructions and construction of the memory measures, see Appendix L.  
Procedure: 
Participants were recruited via MTurk and directed to Qualtrics.com to complete the 
survey. Participants completed two DRM lists (“chair” and “guilty”) with the following 
components: first, participants watched a video presenting the 7-word list with each word 
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presented for 1.5 seconds. Then, after a five-minute interference task, they entered as many 
words as they could remember from the list in 2 minutes, our free recall measure. Next, 
they completed a recognition test measure. It included words on the list (list words), words 
not on the list (new words), and the unifying theme word (the critical lure: either chair or 
guilty). For each of these words, participants responded whether the word was “Old” (on 
the list) or “New” (not on the list) and rated their confidence for this decision on a 1-5 
Likert scale. Finally, if participants rated the word as “Old” they were asked to categorize 
their memory as “Remember” (the memory for the word is clear, with specific details), 
“Know” (the participant does not remember specific details but has a general sense of 
familiarity), or “Guess.” See Appendix L for the memory tests.  
After watching the video and completing the memory tests for the “chair” list, 
participants repeated this procedure for the “guilty” list. The “chair” and “guilty” lists 
participants viewed were determined by random assignment, with participants placed into 
the Strong Association group, Medium Association group, or Weak Association group 
(between subjects; in Sample 2, a quarter of participants were placed into a Medium-Strong 
Association group; Appendix C).  
Hypotheses: 
H1: The association strength of the “guilty” list will generate differences in false 
alarm rates (both free recall and recognition). The strong association “guilty” list will 
produce the most false alarms to “guilty,” followed by the medium association list, and 
lastly the weak association list. 
H2: The association strength of the “guilty” list will generate differences in 
confidence rates for false alarms. The Strong Association “guilty” list will produce highest 
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confidence for false alarms to “guilty,” followed by the Medium Association list, and lastly 
the Weak Association list. 
H3: The association strength of the “guilty” list will generate differences in 
remember/know/guess for false alarms. The Strong Association “guilty” list will produce 
the most “remember” judgments for “guilty,” followed by the Medium Association list, and 
lastly the Weak Association list. Conversely, the Weak Association list will produce the most 
“guess” judgments for “guilty,” followed by the Medium Association list and Strong 
Association list. 
Results:  
Recognition Judgments. In Sample 1, the words that made up the “guilty” list did 
have a significant impact on false recall rate for the critical lure, F(2, 145)=3.99, p=.021, 
𝜂p2=0.052. The forward associative strength of the lists, however, had the opposite effect 
than we predicted: Participants in the Strong Association list had the lowest false alarm rate 
to “guilty” (MStrong=0.48, 95% CI=[0.34,0.62]), whereas participants in the Weak Association 
List had the highest false alarm rate (MWeak=0.73, 95% CI=[0.61,0.86]) with participants in 
the Medium Association list in the middle (MMedium=0.68, 95% CI=[0.54,0.83]). This trend 
was not consistent with the “chair” list control, where the Strong Association list generated 
the most false alarms (MStrong=0.79, 95% CI=[0.67,0.90]) compared to the Medium 
(MMedium=0.59, 95% CI=[0.44,0.74]) and Weak (MWeak=0.63, 95% CI=[0.50,0.77]). Thus, it 
seems that our “guilty” list is behaving differently from the “chair” list in the predictive 
value of the forward associative strength on the DRM effect. Hence, we gathered a second 
sample in order to replicate this trend. 
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 Sample 2 produced the same general trend as Sample 1. Recall that we introduced a 
new list (words 2-8, the “Medium-Strong” list). The Medium-Strong list produced the lowest 
rate of false recall (MMedium-Strong=0.44, 95% CI=[0.30,0.58]), followed by false alarm rates 
similar to Sample 1 for the other lists: the Weak Association list with the most false alarms 
(MWeak=0.70, 95% CI=[0.57,0.83]), followed by the Medium Association (MMedium=0.57, 95% 
CI=[0.43,0.70]), and the Strong Association list (MStrong=0.50, 95% CI=[0.35,0.65]). There 
was, however, no main effect of the list type (F(3, 197)=2.55, p=.057, likely due to the 
minimal difference between the Medium-Strong and Strong lists. 
 
Figure 1. Study 1a Proportion of “Old” responses on Recognition Test 
 
Confidence Judgments. We submitted Confidence judgments for the “guilty” critical 
lure to a one-way ANOVA. Sample 1 data showed a significant main effect of list strength, 
F(2, 145)=6.14, p=.003, 𝜂p2=0.04. This main effect was driven by the fact that participants 
who saw the Strong Association list were significantly more confident in their false alarms 
(MStrong=4.13, 95% CI=[3.79,4.48]) than were participants who saw the Medium Association 
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list (MMedium=3.61, 95% CI=[3.22,4.00]; t(94)=2.01, p=.047, d=0.415, 95% CI=[0.17,0.67]) or 
participants who saw the Weak Association list (MWeak=3.58, 95% CI=[3.21,3.94]; 
t(102)=2.224, p=.028, d=0.43, 95% CI=[0.19,0.68]).  
 This finding did not replicate in Sample 2, however, because there was no main 
effect for list type on confidence (p=.809), and there were no significant differences in 
confidence for participants in the Strong Association list (MStrong=3.61, 95% CI=[3.28,3.94]) 
and any other lists. 
Remember/Know/Guess Judgments. We submitted the R/K/G judgments to a chi-
square test. For both Sample 1 and Sample 2, the chi square tests were not significant 
(Sample 1: 𝛸2(4, N=93)=1.87, p=.759; Sample 2: 𝛸2(6, N=111)=5.14, p=.526). Follow-up 
comparisons revealed no significant differences between any of the specific conditions in 
both samples (all p’s>0.05). Generally speaking, participants tended to make approximately 
the same number of “remember” or “know” judgments per evidence list, while slightly 
fewer made “guess” judgments. Thus, list strength had no apparently effect on the R/K/G 
judgments for “guilty.” 
Discussion: 
Recall that the goal of Study 1a was to determine which 7-word list would best 
decrease the false alarm rate of the “guilty” list to a rate that could avoid a ceiling effect and 
thus allow for more upward movement in our planned studies. Given that our primary 
variable of interest is the Recognition Judgment, and neither Confidence Judgments nor 
R/K/G Judgments revealed any notable trends, we drew our conclusions for this study 
based primarily on the Recognition false alarm rates. Although we predicted that the 
Medium or Weak list may be best suited, it seems the Strong list reliably produced a false 
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alarm rate low enough to avoid a ceiling effect. Although the Medium-Strong also showed a 
lower activation rate, we only included it as an extra measurement point when replicating 
Sample 1. Thus, the Medium-Strong list may be useful in future research, but based on two 
samples, the Strong list is the best candidate for testing the main research question of Study 
1b: Can we use the 7-word list to measure differences in associations between guilty and 
forms of evidence? 
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CHAPTER 7: STUDY 1B 
Design: 
Between-subjects 5 group design (Evidence form: Control, Confession, DNA, 
Fingerprint, Eyewitness). In a departure from our earlier work, we used fingerprint as a 
form of evidence instead of bitemark. Participants in the Bitemark List condition did not 
show different effects from the DNA list. Furthermore, fingerprints are similar to 
confessions in a way DNA and eyewitnesses are not. As evidence, DNA or eyewitnesses can 
be offered as incriminating or exonerating. However, confessions are only incriminating. 
Similarly, fingerprint matches are offered primarily as incriminating evidence. Thus, a 
Fingerprint List condition allows us to compare the association between guilt and evidence 
that can indicate guilt or innocence to evidence that only indicates guilt. 
Participants: 
We collected data from 1423 MTurk workers. Of these, we excluded 407 for failing 
to follow directions and/or technical issues. Thus, our final sample included 1016 
participants (206 saw the Control list; 200 the Confession list; 204 the DNA list; 214 the 
Eyewitness list; and 192 the Fingerprint list). Participants were primarily female (N=714; 
male N=302), with an average age of 37.53 (SD=11.97). Given that our previous findings 
had effect sizes that were small to insignificant, we assumed differences in evidence 
inclusion would produce small-to-medium effect sizes. Thus, a priori power analyses 
calculate that this sample size, approximately 200 per cell, will be sufficient to detect a 
small-to-medium effect size (d=0.30) with 80% power.  
English was the primary language of all but 16 participants; however these 16 
participants provided free responses in the free recall sections and open-ended comments 
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sections without spelling errors and with good grammar. Further, excluding these 
participants did not change the pattern of results.  One hundred and twenty-eight of the 
participants had earned a graduate degree; 430 earned a college degree; 545 earned a high 
school diploma; and 4 had not finished high school. 
We also asked participants whether they had served on a jury (Yes=181 
participants), and whether a close friend or family member had ever been convicted of a 
crime(Yes=227 participants). Excluding these participants did not change our results for 
any of the analyses, and did not differ from participants who responded “no,” (with the 
exception of Confidence for participants who had served on a jury; this subset is reported 
below in the appropriate Results section) so we report data with all participants included.  
Materials: 
 DRM Guilty List. Based on the results from Study 1a, we used the Strong Association 
7-word “guilty” DRM list as our base Control list. Then, as in previous work, we removed 
the 7th word from the list and inserted the experimentally-manipulated form of evidence 
into fourth position on the list. Thus, we created five 7-word lists: a Control list, a Confession 
list, a DNA list, an Eyewitness list, and a Fingerprint list (see Appendix C for the full lists).  
 DRM Chair List. For a control, we used the first seven words in the “chair” DRM list 
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995).  
 For the instructions and construction of the memory measures, see Appendix L. 
Procedure:  
Recruitment, list presentation, and memory measures were identical to Study 1a. 
Participants first viewed a “chair” list, completed memory measures, and then viewed one 
of five “guilty” lists, based on random assignment: Control, Confession, DNA, Eyewitness, 
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Fingerprint. After viewing the “guilty” list and a five-minute delay task, participants 
completed memory measures (free recall, recognition old/new judgments, confidence 
judgments, and remember/know/guess judgments if they judged a word as “old”) for the 
list, and were then debriefed. 
Hypotheses: 
H4: The Confession and DNA lists will generate the most false alarms, while the 
Control list will generate the least false alarms. The Eyewitness and Fingerprint lists will 
generate fewer than the Confession and DNA lists, but more than the Control.  
H5: The Confession and DNA lists will generate the highest confidence for the critical 
lure of the lists, followed by the Eyewitness and Fingerprint lists. The Control list will 
generate the lowest confidence for the critical lure.  
H6: The Confession and DNA lists will generate the most “remember” judgments and 
fewest “guess” judgments for false alarms, while the Control list will generate the fewest 
“remember” judgments and most “guess” judgments. The Eyewitness and Fingerprint lists 
will generate intermediary “remember” and “guess” judgments.  
 Based on our previous work, we expect these differences between groups to be 
small effect sizes (Cohen’s d=0.2) 
Results: 
Free Response. Notably, the false recall rates for each group were extraordinarily 
low, ranging from MDNA=0.05, 95% CI=[0.02, 0.04] to MControl=0.09, 95% CI=[0.05, 0.12]. We 
submitted these data to a five-way ANOVA, which was not statistically significant, F(4, 
1011)=0.77, p=.544. All follow-up t-test comparisons were insignificant as well, p=[.088, 
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.904]. Thus, our hypothesis was not supported: there were no significant differences in 
activation of “guilty” based on the evidence in the list. 
 
Figure 2. Study 1b proportion of “guilty” responses to Free Recall Test 
 
Recognition Judgments. In line with Study 1a results, false alarm rates to the critical 
lure were much lower than our previous work (participants who read the Control list had a 
mean false alarm rate of MControl=0.48 95% CI=[0.41, 0.55]). However, there was little 
variation between the all of the lists (minimum: MDNA=0.46 95% CI=[0.39, 0.52]; maximum: 
MConfession=0.53 95% CI=[0.46, 0.60]. Statistical tests supported the lack of difference 
between groups, as the five-level ANOVA was not significant, (F(4, 1011)=0.68, p=.603) and 
none of the between-group follow-up t-tests were significant (p=[.137, .983]). Despite not 
achieving statistically significance, it is interesting that the Confession List yielded the 
highest false alarm rate, while the DNA List yielded the lowest. Although our 7-word list 
successfully decreased the average false alarm rate for the critical lure, the results do not 
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support our hypothesis of the DNA and Confession Lists causing more false alarms than the 
other lists. 
 
Figure 3. Study 1b proportion of “Old” responses on Recognition Test 
 
Confidence Judgments. Confidence ratings (1-5 Likert Scale; higher scores indicating 
greater confidence in Old/New judgments) were submitted to a five-level ANOVA, and 
similarly yielded no significant differences, F(4, 1011)=1.23, p=.296. Indeed, no follow-up t-
tests between groups were significant either: maximum MControl=3.83, 95% CI=[3.67, 3.99]; 
minimum MConfession=3.60, 95% CI=[3.43, 3.77]; p=[.052, .955]. Thus, these data provided no 
support for our hypothesis that the DNA and Confession list would produce higher 
confidence for “guilty” recognition judgments than the other lists.  
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Figure 4. Study 1b confidence for Recognition Test responses to “guilty” 
 
As mentioned previously, participants who had served on a jury (N=178; between 
27 and 46 participants per group) showed significant differences in confidence ratings for 
each list, F(4, 177)=2.71, p=.032, motivated primarily by significantly higher confidence for 
the DNA List (M=4.11, 95% CI [3.88, 4.34]) than the Confession List (M=3.36, 95% CI [2.92, 
3.81]; t(80)=3.23, p=.002, d=0.729 95% CI [0.506, 0.952]). However, because we find no 
other significant effects for responses from this subgroup, and this specific effect 
disappears from the overall sample, we refrain from interpreting this result. 
Remember/Know/Guess Judgments. We submitted R/K/G judgments to a chi square 
test of independence to investigate whether the evidence form on the list impacted the 
phenomenological quality of false alarming to “guilty.” Recall that we only asked those who 
selected “old” to make a R/K/G judgment. We found no support for our hypothesis, the chi 
square was not significant χ2(8, N=505)=6.86, p=.552. Follow-up comparisons revealed no 
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significant differences between any of the specific lists (all p’s>.05). Generally speaking, 
participants tended to make approximately the same number of “remember” or “know” 
judgments per evidence list, while slightly fewer made “guess” judgments (See Table 1). 
Table 1 
Study 1b R/K/G Ratings for “Old” guilty ratings 
List Type Remember Know Guess Total 
Control 35 39 25 99 
Confession 34 41 31 106 
DNA 38 35 20 93 
Eyewitness 32 31 32 98 
Fingerprint 35 31 32 98 
 
Discussion: 
 Recall that the goal of the first study was twofold: first, Study 1a aimed to use a 7-
word list that reduced the rate of false recognition for the critical lure “guilty,” and Study 1b 
tested for automatic associations between specific forms of evidence and guilt by placing 
the evidence as one word in the shorter, weaker “guilty” list. 
 Study 1a was, overall, successful. Participants falsely remembered seeing “guilty” on 
the 7-word list about 50% of the time, thus providing us with a usable 7-word list for Study 
1b. However, this success comes with a surprising trend. We expected forward associative 
strength to be positively correlated with the rate of false alarms to “guilty,” such that the 
Strong and Medium-Strong lists generate the most false alarms and the Weak list to 
generate the least. In fact, we found the opposite: Weak (Sample 1 MWeak=0.73; Sample 2 
MWeak=0.70) and Medium (Sample 1 MMedium=0.68; Sample 2 MMedium=0.57) lists generated 
the highest rates of “guilty” false alarms—in some cases, rates similar to the 14-word 
Control lists in previous studies. The Strong list, on the other hand, generated a false alarm 
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rate closer to the 50% we desired (Sample 1 MStrong=0.48; Sample 2 MStrong=0.50). This 
negative correlation is surprising in light of previous research that forward associative 
strength is positively correlated with critical lure false alarm rates (Gallo, 2010). Indeed, 
we found this positive correlation with our control “chair” list. Thus, it seems that for our 
list, a word’s forward associative strength to “guilty” may not be directly relatable to its 
backward associative strength with “guilty” (which we have not measured). We believe this 
is a feature of the “guilty” list deserving of future investigation. Indeed, a first step would be 
to measure the BAS between the list words and “guilty” and compare those to our FAS 
values from previous work. By doing this, we may verify that the backward associative 
strength is, in fact, stronger for our Weak list, and hence explaining the surprising results of 
Study 1a. 
  In Study 1B, we expected that a weaker, shorter 7-word list would make this 
paradigm more sensitive than our previous work to associations between forensic 
evidence and guilt in two ways. First, we expected that the lower false alarm rate would 
avoid a potential ceiling effect by allowing more “room” for a strongly-associated word to 
activate the critical lure at a higher rate. Second, we expected that fewer words would 
allow each word to proportionately contribute more to activating the critical lure, thereby 
magnifying the effect of changing a single word (the form of evidence).  
 Despite our weakened list, we did not find support for our hypotheses that lists 
containing DNA and Confession would generate more false alarms to “guilty” than other lists 
across all four of our dependent measures. One possible explanation for the lack of 
significant differences is that even with a 7-word list, changing a single word on the list is 
insufficient to alter the semantic activation strength for “guilty.” Indeed, as the results of 
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Study 1a show, cutting the list in half only reduced false alarm rates by approximately 5%-
25%, compared to previous work with the 14-word list. Thus, while the 7-word list may 
avoid a ceiling effect in false alarm rate, it may not prevent a ceiling effect for the 
proportional contribution of each word in activating the semantic network. Successful 
development of this paradigm may require a list made of words with very weak forward 
associative strength with “guilty”—metrics that we do not presently have and, given the 
seemingly negative relationship between FAS and false alarm rates (Study 1a), we cannot 
estimate. 
 In summary, using the 7-word list did not yield different results from a 14-word list. 
Although the false recognition rates were in line with what we suspected would make for a 
more sensitive paradigm, we failed to find any significant differences between the different 
evidence lists. Thus, while these results are interesting from a DRM-design standpoint, a 
traditional DRM list appears ineffective for measuring automatic associations between 
evidence and guilt. Fortunately, we have other ecologically-valid methods of influencing the 
semantic activation of the critical lure—namely, by manipulating the context in which the 
list words are given. Our next step was to test for automatic associations with a more 
context-rich paradigm. 
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CHAPTER 8: STUDY 2 – THE DRM STORY FORMAT 
Given the contrived nature of a list of words used in the previous experiment, our 
next goal was to increase the ecological validity of our guilty associations paradigm to a 
method more in line with how people normally encounter information. One way to 
accomplish this goal is to present the DRM words in a story structure, allowing us to test 
whether some forms of evidence show greater association with guilt than others in a more 
context-rich paradigm. By presenting a DRM Story instead of a DRM list, we hypothesized 
the context provided by the Story format would increase the association between the list 
words and the critical lure (Dewhurst, Pursglove, & Lewis, 2007). More specifically, instead 
of having the “guilty” list words presented one a time, here we instructed participants to 
read a paragraph containing these words. For example, participants read: “A jury is a group 
of citizens that reviews information in a case to determine whether a crime has been 
committed. The judge provides order...”  
The story format provides context that, by explaining how a trial works, makes the 
connection between the words easier to detect. We expected that adding this context 
would produce a deeper semantic processing of the words, a process that, compared to 
shallow processing, produces more false alarms to the critical lure (Toglia, Neuschatz, & 
Goodwin, 1999; Thapar & McDermott, 2001). It is likely that when people read about 
information for a criminal investigation, they automatically consider the evidence present 
to determine guilt. That participants may evaluate the story (focusing on evaluating 
evidence) is, to our knowledge, unique to our DRM list and should result in a deeper 
semantic connection to “guilty.” In turn, the more strongly a piece of evidence indicates 
guilt, the stronger the activation of the concept of guilt. As a result, we expected that 
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participants in the Confession Story and DNA Story conditions would false alarm to the 
critical lure more than participants in the other groups, enhanced by the context and 
deeper semantic processing of the evidence in the Story. 
The research on false memories for implied content is particularly relevant here. 
Chan and McDermott (2006) found that people can form false memories for seeing implied, 
but not presented, information. To elaborate, they asked participants to read sentences 
that pragmatically implied, but did not explicitly state, some idea. Later, the researchers 
tested the participants’ memory for the sentences they read, and sentences the participants 
did not read but contained the implied message. For example, participants would read “The 
new baby stayed awake all night” but then see at test “The new baby cried all night” and 
rate their memory for the sentence with a “remember”, “know”, or “guess” judgment. Chan 
and McDermott found that participants generally responded to the implied messages with 
“remember” and “know” at rates very similar to presented information. The paradigm Chan 
and McDermott used is analogous to what we designed here. It stands to reason that many 
participants could read a DRM story about “guilty” and derive the implication the 
paragraph describes a guilty person. Although our memory test is focused specifically on 
single words, rather than whole sentences and the message they communicate, we may still 
be able to elicit false alarms to “guilty” with a DRM story. In fact, given Chan and 
McDermott’s findings that implied information was recalled with the same 
phenomenological strength as studied information, the added context may strengthen the 
memory quality for “guilty” in addition to increasing the frequency of false alarms. 
Alternatively, it is possible that a DRM Story would actually decrease false alarm 
rates to the critical lure. Previous research has found that ease of theme identifiability is an 
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important predictor for false recall of the critical lure: When a theme is highly identifiable, 
(as in a DRM Story, the very reason it was developed to be used with child participants), 
adults show a decreased false alarm rate for the critical lure (Carneiro, Fernandez, & Dias, 
2009). Carneiro et al. (2012) argued that this seemingly counter-intuitive finding is due to 
adults’ use of an “identify-to-reject” strategy: if a participant is able to identify the theme of 
a list (the critical lure) and notice that specific word is missing, they will not show the DRM 
effect. Therefore, if our DRM Story makes the theme of “guilty” highly identifiable, it could 
lead to a decrease in false alarms. Furthermore, if this increase in theme identifiability 
occurs, we could have an effect opposite of what we predict for our evidence forms: by 
removing an associated word and including a weakly-associated type of evidence, “guilty” 
could be less identifiable, thereby increasing false alarms for the critical lure. 
As with Study 1, Study 2 was conducted in two parts: In 2a, we developed a “guilty” 
DRM Story format that we could use for 2b. In 2b, we used that “guilty” DRM Story to test 
automatic associations between evidence and guilt in a manner similar to Study 1b. As 
such, we can make the same predictions regarding false alarms to “guilty” here as in Study 
1. We expect participants reading a “guilty” story that contains DNA and confession to false 
alarm to the critical lure more often than participants who view a story containing more 
weakly-associated forms of evidence or those viewing the Control story. 
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CHAPTER 9: STUDY 2A 
 
Design: 
There were no experimental manipulations in this study. In two samples, all 
participants read the same “guilty” DRM story. Each sample viewed a slightly different 
version of the “guilty” DRM story (Sample 1: 14-word; Sample 2: 7-word) 
Participants: 
Sample 1. We collected data from 75 MTurk workers. Of these, we excluded 6 for 
failing to follow directions and/or technical issues. Thus, our final sample included 69 
participants. There were 27 females, 25 males, and they had an average age of 37.99 
(SD=12.02). English was the primary language of all participants. Eleven held graduate 
degrees, 30 college degrees, and 27 high school diplomas, and 1 did not complete high 
school.2 
Sample 2. We collected 31 data from MTurk workers. Of these, 7 were excluded, 
leaving 24 in our final analysis. There were 14 females, 10 males, and they had an average 
age of 38.79 (SD=10.63). English was the primary language of all but one participant. Two 
held graduate degrees, 11 college degrees, and 8 high school diplomas, and 2 did not finish 
high school.  
Materials:  
We adapted our “guilty” DRM list to construct two “guilty” DRM Stories: a 14-word 
and 7-word version. Both Stories generally describe the legal process. The goal was to 
create a list that produces 30% recognition false alarms to the critical lure. We proposed 
                                                        
2 This is the same sample as Study 3a Sample 1. After reading the Story Format and taking 
the memory test, these participants then read the evidence primes in Study 3a. 
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30% as a cut off because it conforms to previously-developed DRM lists (“king”, 27%; 
Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1995), but we expected to have a lower false alarm rate 
than the list-format in Study 1 because our adults may use a “search-to-reject” strategy, 
minimizing the DRM effect.  
The 14-word version contained the fourteen “guilty” list words from previous work, 
and was 133 words overall (emphasis added). The 14 words appeared in the same order as 
the list, that is, ordered from strongest to weakest forward associative strength. 
14-word Story (Sample 1) A jury is a group of normal citizens that reviews 
information in a case to determine whether a crime has been committed. The judge 
provides order and gives instructions. In some cases, family members and 
interested community members can be present in the court as well. If a person 
loses, they will be considered a criminal. If they win, they are usually innocent and 
show this by the end of the trial. If they lose, they are sent to jail, especially for 
murder. They are also labeled as a convict, which sometimes makes them feel 
shame. Of course, a person is not alone – they usually have a lawyer on their side to 
argue before the verdict, as well as help them get a fair sentence. Thus, many people 
are involved in the system. 
 
The 7-word version contained the same seven words used in Study 1b, and was 72 
words overall. We tested a 7-word paragraph for the same reason we developed a 7-word 
list: a 7-word paragraph has a better chance of avoiding a false alarm ceiling rate, and the 
substitution of one word should have a larger impact on semantic activation. 
7-word Story (Sample 2) A jury is a group of normal citizens that reviews 
information in a case to determine whether a crime has been committed. The judge 
provides order and gives instructions. In some cases, family members and 
interested community members can be present in the court as well. If a person 
loses, they will be considered a criminal. If they win, they are usually innocent and 
show this by the end of the trial.  
 
For the instructions and construction of the memory measures, see Appendix L. 
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Procedure: 
We directed our mTurk participants to Qualtrics.com where they viewed the “guilty” 
DRM Story. After a five minute delay, participants completed a Free Recall measure, where 
we asked them to replicate the story paragraph they read as closely as possible. Afterward, 
they completed the same Recognition test (Old/New judgments), Confidence measure, and 
Remember/Know/Guess judgments for words they determined were Old, as in Study 1a 
and 1b. 
Results: 
 The goal of this study was to find a DRM Story paragraph that activated the critical 
lure enough to be useful for our experiments— a minimum of 30% to keep it similar to the 
weakest widely-used DRM list (“king”; Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1995). To make 
this determination we relied primarily on the Recognition judgments, with Free Recall 
rates as a secondary measure. Given that the 7-word list we employed in Study 1b did not 
provide useful data for Free Recall, likely because of a floor effect, we were interested in 
whether the Story format would produce a different trend. As such, we did not analyze or 
interpret Confidence or R/K/G judgments in this study. 
 Free Recall Between the two samples, participants demonstrated an unexpectedly 
high rate of reporting “guilty” on the Free Recall memory test. In Sample 1, M14-Word=0.710 
of participants false alarmed to guilty. In Sample 2, M7-Word=0.708 of participants false 
alarmed. Independent sample t-tests revealed these two rates were not significantly 
different from one another (t(91)=0.02, p=.987). 
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Recognition Judgments Similar to the Free Recall measure, participants false alarmed 
to “guilty” at a much higher rate than was expected. In Sample 1, M14-Word=0.826 false 
alarmed, while in Sample 2, M7-word=0.917 false alarmed. Although these rates varied 
slightly, t-test comparisons revealed they were not significantly different from one another 
(t(91)=1.06, p=.290). 
Discussion: 
Overall, the “guilty” DRM Story format was far more successful than we expected. 
While we expected false recognition rates around 30%, participants actually false alarmed 
two- to three-times as often. Further, while we made no specific predictions about Free 
Recall false alarms, we did not expect such high rates as we found here. Recall the purpose 
of Study 2a was to develop a usable Story format for “guilty” for use in Study 2b. The best 
story, then, would be one that would maximize the chances of measuring changes in 
semantic activation: Based on these results, we concluded the 7-word Story was best 
suited. We reasoned that in a 7-word story, a single word would contribute proportionally 
more to the semantic activation than would a single word in the 14-word story. Further, 
because the 7-word and 14-word stories were not significantly different in Free Recall and 
Recognition false alarms, the 7-word story does not have any memory test disadvantages. 
Thus, we can test our main research question with a context-rich “guilty” DRM story: Can 
we detect differences in automatic association between specific forms of evidence and 
guilt? 
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CHAPTER 10: STUDY 2B 
Design: 
Between-subjects 5-group design (DRM Story Evidence form: Control, confession, 
DNA, fingerprint, eyewitness). 
Participants:  
We recruited 1188 MTurk workers. Of these, we excluded 179 for failing to follow 
directions and/or technical issues. Thus, our final sample included 1009 participants (204 
saw the Control list; 202 the Confession list; 201 the DNA list; 200 the Eyewitness list; and 
202 the Fingerprint list). Participants were primarily female (N=713; male N=296), with an 
average age of 38.05 (SD=12.43). Given that our previous findings had effect sizes that 
were small to insignificant, we assumed any observed differences as a result of our 
experimental manipulation would produce small-to-medium effect sizes. Thus, a-prior 
power analyses calculate that this sample size, approximately 200 per cell, would be 
sufficient to detect a small-to-medium effect size (d=0.30) with 80% power.  
English was the primary language of all but 15 participants; however these 15 
participants provided free responses in the free recall sections and open-ended comments 
sections without spelling errors and with good grammar. Further, excluding these 
participants did not change the pattern of results.  One hundred and thirty-one of the 
participants held graduate degrees; 429 college degrees; 442 high school diplomas; and 7 
had not finished high school. 
As in Study 1b, we performed each of our analyses for participants who had served 
on a jury (N=168) and participants who have had a close family member or friend 
convicted of a serious crime (N=247). For the results of the Recognition Test, Confidence, 
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and R/K/G judgments, results do not differ between subsets of participants, nor from the 
results of the combined sample. There were, however, differences for the Free Recall 
responses between subsets, which we report below. 
Materials: 
 DRM “Guilty” Story. Based on the results of Study 2a, we developed a 7-word DRM 
Story with the critical lure “guilty.” This version served as our Control Story. We also 
created four other versions, each containing a different form of evidence (confession, DNA, 
eyewitness, or fingerprint). These lists were created in the same manner as Study 1b: We 
removed the last word (“trial”) and placed the evidence word in a novel sentence in the 
middle of the story paragraph (see Appendix F). 
 DRM “Sleep” Story. As a control list, we had participants read the DRM “sleep” story 
(Dewhurst, et al. 2007). Because we wanted to keep it approximately the same length as 
our “guilty” story (72 words), we used the full “sleep” story that contains fourteen sleep-
related words (80 words total) rather than a story containing only the first seven words 
(38 words total). 
 For the instructions and construction of the memory measures, see Appendix L. 
Procedure: 
The procedure was identical to Study 1b with one exception: the Free Recall portion 
asked participants to replicate the entire paragraph they read, rather than list words. 
Hypotheses: 
H7: The Confession and DNA stories will generate the most false alarms (both free 
recall and recognition), while the Control stories will generate the fewest false alarms. The 
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Eyewitness and Fingerprint stories will generate fewer than the Confession and DNA 
stories, but more than the Control.  
H8: The Confession and DNA stories will generate the highest confidence for the 
critical lure of the stories, followed by the Eyewitness and Fingerprint stories. The Control 
story will generate the lowest confidence for the critical lure.  
H9: The Confession and DNA stories will generate the most “remember” judgments 
and fewest “guess” judgments for false alarms, while the Control stories will generate the 
fewest “remember” judgments and most “guess” judgments. The Eyewitness and 
Fingerprint stories will generate intermediary “remember” and “guess” judgments. 
 Based on our previous work, we expect these differences between groups to be 
small effect sizes (Cohen’s d=0.20) 
Results: 
 Free Response. On average, Free Recall rates were lower than Study 2a (minimum: 
MEyewitness=0.50, 95% CI=[.43, .57]; maximum: MDNA=0.66, 95% CI=[.59, .72]), but much 
higher than any of our previous work using the list format. We submitted the data to a five-
level ANOVA, which yielded a significant effect of list type, F(4, 1004)=3.12, p=.015, 
𝜂p2=0.012. This main effect is driven primarily by significant differences between the DNA 
Story group (MDNA=0.66, 95% CI=[.59, .72]) and the Control Story group (MControl=0.51, 95% 
CI=[.45, .58], t(403)=2.92, p=.004, d=0.313 95% CI[0.254, 0.372]) and the Eyewitness Story 
group (MEyewitness=0.50, 95% CI=[.43, .57], t(399)=3.21, p=.001, d=0.328, 95% CI=[0.281. 
0.376]. All other follow-up comparisons were not significant, p=[.72, .768] (Appendix H) 
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Figure 5.  Study 2b proportion of “guilty” responses to Free Recall Test 
  
 It is worth noting that the main effect for List Type did not reach statistical 
significance for the participants who had served on a jury (N=168; F(4, 163)=1.31, p=.267), 
nor for the participants with a close friend or family member convicted of a felony (N=247; 
F(4, 242)=1.47, p=.213). For both of these groups, however, the results showed the same 
general trend, with participants who viewed the DNA story showing high rates of false 
recall (jury subgroup, M=0.60, 95% CI [.43, .77]; felony subgroup, M=0.60, 95% CI [.47, 
.74]) compared to all other list types except for the Fingerprint List (jury subgroup, M=0.64, 
95% CI [.46, .81]; felony subgroup, M=0.63, 95% CI [.49, .78]). Because the trends were 
very similar, and the subsets represent a fraction of the sample size we predicted we would 
need, we do not think these differences between subsets are meaningful. 
To summarize, here our hypotheses were partially supported: Participants who 
read the DNA Story did, in fact, show significantly more false alarms than two of the other 
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groups. However, participants in the Confession group did not false alarm more than other 
groups. 
 Recognition Judgments. There was very little variability in false alarming to “guilty” 
on the Recognition test between groups: minimum, MControl=0.84, 95% CI=[.79, .89]: 
maximum: MDNA=0.89, 95% CI=[.84, .93] and MEyewitness=0.89, 95% CI=[.84, .93]. We 
submitted recognition judgments to a five-level ANOVA, which yielded no main effect, F(4, 
1004)=0.65, p=.630. Unsurprisingly, follow-up t-test comparisons yielded no significant 
differences between any of the groups, p=[.214, .986]. Thus, the data provided no evidence 
for our hypotheses: neither the DNA nor Confession Stories caused more false alarms on the 
Recognition Test than other evidence Stories. While the Control Story did cause the fewest 
false alarms, it was not significantly lower than any other groups. 
 
Figure 6. Study 2b proportion of “Old” responses on Recognition Test 
 Confidence Judgments. The Story Format produced higher Confidence judgments for 
“guilty” than we found using the List format in Study 1b (minimum: MControl=4.27, 95% 
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CI=[4.13, 4.41]: maximum: MFingerprint=4.47, 95% CI=[4.35, 4.59]). We submitted the data to 
a five-level ANOVA, which did not yield a significant main effect, F(4, 1004)=1.36, p=.246. 
There was, however, one significant difference in the follow-up t-tests: Participants in the 
Fingerprint Story group were more confident in their decisions about the critical lure than 
were participants in the Control Story group, t(404)=2.09, p=.037, d=0.208, 95% CI=[0.114, 
0.301]. No other comparisons between groups were statistically significant, p=[.073, .806]. 
 
Figure 7. Study 2b Confidence for Recognition Test responses to “guilty” 
 Despite the significant difference between participants who read the Fingerprint 
Story and participants who read the Control Story, we did not find support for our 
hypotheses. Although the Control story did generate the lowest confidence ratings, it was 
only significantly lower than participants who saw the Fingerprint list. Similarly, 
participants who read the DNA and Confession stories were not the most confident about 
their decision for “guilty,” which is what we predicted. 
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R/K/G Judgments. As in Study 1b, we tested whether different forms of evidence on 
the “guilty” list led to phenomenologically different false alarms to the critical lure. We did 
not find any differences between groups, providing no support for our hypothesis: χ2(8, 
N=873)=487, p=.771. Follow-up comparisons did not reveal any significant differences 
between specific list conditions (all p’s>.05).  
Interestingly, the overall trend of R/K/G responses for all lists did differ from Study 
1b. Recall that in Study 1b, participants (regardless of the list they saw) responded 
approximately equally with “remember” and “know” responses, with slightly fewer “guess” 
responses. Here, however, the vast majority of participants responded with “remember” 
responses, followed by “know” responses, and then very few “Guess” responses (See Table 
2) 
Table 2. 
Study 2b R/K/G Ratings for “Old” guilty ratings 
List Type Remember Know Guess Total 
Control 121 42 9 172 
Confession 126 37 9 172 
DNA 121 44 13 178 
Eyewitness 115 53 9 177 
Fingerprint 119 43 12 174 
 
Discussion: 
 As with Study 1, Study 2 was partially successful. On the one hand, we successfully 
developed a “guilty” DRM Story. The majority of participants falsely recalled reading 
“guilty” in a paragraph about the criminal justice system—both on the Free Recall and 
Recognition memory tests—with high confidence. On the other hand, the different evidence 
lists did not result in differences for any of our memory measures. 
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 Despite no significant findings between the different lists, we are largely encouraged 
by the success of the story structure. It appears that the added context is quite effective in 
activating participants’ network of “guilty” in such a way that, perhaps, leaves it resistant to 
a “search to reject” strategy that typically produces a decreased DRM effect in adults. 
Although the Recognition Test responses were higher than we expected, we are 
particularly interested in the Free Recall rates. It seems that “guilty” is a key component to 
participants’ understanding of a story about the legal system. Put another way, participants 
cannot help but activate “guilty” when the story format provides context of a person in the 
legal system—something we find troubling, if not unsurprising (see the Conclusion section 
below for a more in depth discussion of this possibility). Further, the trend of R/K/G 
suggests that not only are participants activating “guilty” more easily, but so too are they 
activating it more strongly. Nearly 69% of participants responded “remember” for the 
critical lure—a strikingly high rate for a false memory. Thus, the added context of a 
criminal trial that the story format provides, seems to activate “guilty” more easily and in a 
more detailed, phenomenologically-real way. 
 That participants reported such a high rate of clear, phenomenologically-strong 
false memories also suggests a reason that we found no differences between groups: a 
ceiling effect. Given the notably high rates of false free recall and false recognition, it may 
be that strongly-associated forms of evidence cannot drive false alarms rates any higher. 
Indeed, this was our rationale for the use of potentially-weaker 7-word lists in Study 1. One 
solution to such a ceiling effect may be to design a story format that has a weaker 
association to “guilty.” Because less work has been done with the DRM story format than 
the DRM list—particularly with adult populations—the exact method of how to accomplish 
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this would require further testing. One option may be to utilize a story that is not so clearly 
about a trial; perhaps a vignette that describes both criminal and non-criminal activities. 
Another possibility may be using the key words in a more ambiguous context. Of course, 
this is easier for some words than others: “judge,” “trial,” and “court” are words we use in 
non-criminal contexts all the time, whereas words like “lawyer” and “crime” are fairly 
specific to the judicial system. 
 Overall, we found the story format to be a very successful paradigm for eliciting 
false alarms to “guilty”—but less successful for our purpose of measuring associations 
between “guilty” and evidence. The high rates of false alarms on the Free Recall, and the 
clear trend in R/K/G responses, suggest this format offers a study of guilt associations that 
the traditional DRM list does not. Although we did not find evidence to support our 
hypotheses regarding the strength of association between guilt and different forms of 
evidence, we think the “guilty” story can be a valuable research tool for more general 
investigations of how people think of, and remember, guilt.  
Clearly, the additional context afforded by a story format increases semantic 
activation of “guilt” compared to the simpler list format. Yet, this increase in context did not 
make differential associations between evidence and guilt easier to detect. One potential 
reason for the lack of differences may be that our participants did not consider any of the 
evidence forms to be different in the context in the trial—all evidence indicated “guilt,” 
regardless of the degree.  Our next step, then, was to influence context in a different way by 
exerting more control over how people viewed the different forms of evidence. Rather than 
exploit the overall context of “guilty,” we can instead influence the association between 
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evidence and guilt more specifically—that is, by providing contextual information that 
influences how people think about the form of evidence via priming.   
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CHAPTER 11: STUDY 3 – PRIMING EVIDENCE QUALITY 
 
In the real world, high-quality evidence should lead to more convictions than low-
quality evidence. Jury decision-making research has, to some extent, supported this 
premise. Several studies have found that when expert testimony is present, or fully 
explained, participants show increased sensitivity to the strengths and weaknesses of such 
evidence (e.g., Cutler, Dexter, & Penrod, 1989; Kovera, Gresham, Borgida, Gray, & Regan, 
1997) Further, in a meta-analytic review of 206 studies using deliberating jurors, Devine, 
Clayton, Dunford, Seying and Price (2000) found strength of evidence was one of the 
strongest predictors of a guilty verdict: The stronger the evidence, the more likely the jury 
concluded the defendant was guilty. However, it is worth noting that several studies (e.g., 
Levett & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff & Duckworth, 2010) have found that jurors are sometimes 
unable to differentiate between good and bad evidence.  
Taken together, these results suggest that any method that would cause someone to 
view a specific type of evidence as higher quality would cause a corresponding increase in 
the association between that evidence and guilt.  Conversely, any manipulation that leads 
someone to see a particular form of evidence as being of poorer quality should equally 
decrease the association between that evidence and guilt. Thus, if we can influence how 
people view the quality of a specific form of evidence, such strengthening or weakening of 
the association between that evidence and guilt could be measurable with our DRM 
paradigm in the form of more (or less) false recall. Priming is one such method that may 
cause such a shift in association strength, because it has been used successfully to influence 
how people false alarm on a DRM task (Lenton et al., 2001; Takarangi et al., 2007). In our 
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study, the primes will be information regarding the scientific validity of each form of 
evidence.  
Scientists have established standards for forensic evidence: some versions are of 
high validity, such as DNA; others are characterized as unscientific, such as bitemark 
evidence (National Academy of Sciences, 2009; 2014). However, previous research has 
demonstrated contextual information about forensic evidence can alter how people regard 
that evidence. Lawson (2014) found that participants who read illustrative stories about 
legal cases that included facts about evidence altered their views about the validity of 
evidence. Lawson was primarily motivated in how pretrial publicity about evidence quality 
can influence a case. Whereas pretrial publicity studies have normally focused on guilt 
judgments and more direct judgments of the defendant (e.g., Ruva &  McEvoy, 2008), 
pretrial information can also affect the case indirectly by influencing opinions of evidence. 
Here, we seek to accomplish something similar by directly influencing how our participants 
view evidence in an attempt to alter that evidence’s connection to guilt. 
 It is likely, however, that some forms of evidence are more resistant to priming than 
others. Forms of evidence that are more closely associated with guilty, such as confession 
and DNA, would likely require extremely strong manipulations to influence that 
association. For example, as reviewed in Chapter 1, both real cases and laboratory research 
have demonstrated a confession very likely leads to a guilty verdict (Kassin & Sukel, 1997) 
and is more likely to lead to a guilty verdict than other forms of evidence (Kassin and 
Neumann, 1997). Weaker-associated evidence-types, such as eyewitness and fingerprints, 
that sometimes (but do not always) lead to a guilty verdict, may be more susceptible to 
such priming, because a person’s belief in the reliability of these forms of evidence may be 
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easier to shift. Therefore, in Study 3 we ask, can priming participants with evidence quality 
affect the evidence’s association with guilt in a DRM paradigm? 
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CHAPTER 12: STUDY 3A 
 
Design:  
Because the goal of this Study was to generate effective negative- and positive-
evidence primes, there was no experimental manipulation. Instead, participants saw either 
two positive- and two negative-evidence lists (Sample 1) or one of the eight possible 
primes (Samples 2 & 3). We varied the number of primes participants saw after Sample 1 
due to concerns over anchoring-and-adjustment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) for 
particularly strong and weak forms of evidence (see Results for the full rationale).  
Participants: 
In Sample 1, we collected data from 75 MTurk workers. Of these, we excluded 6 for 
failing to follow directions and/or technical issues. Thus, our final sample included 69 
participants (35 saw the DNA-, Confession+, Fingerprint+, and Eyewitness- primes; 34 saw 
the DNA+, Confession-, Fingerprint-, and Eyewitness- primes). Participants were 27 female, 
25 male, with an average age of 37.99 (SD=12.02). English was the primary language of all 
participants. 11 held graduate degrees, 30 college degrees, and 27 high school diplomas, 
and 1 did not complete high school.3 
 In Sample 2, we collected data from 81 participants and excluded 14. Our final 
sample included 67 participants (approximately 8 participants saw each of the eight 
primes; see Table 4 for exact N per cell), 39 of which were female and 28 male, with an 
average age of 38.40 (SD=11.73). English was the primary language of all participants; 8 
                                                        
3 This is the same sample as Study 2a Sample 1. After reading the Story Format and taking 
the memory test, these participants then read the evidence primes for this study.  
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held graduate degrees, 27 college degrees, 29 high school diplomas, and 3 did not complete 
high school.  
 Sample 3 was composed of 163 participants, 8 of whom we excluded, leaving 155 
participants for analyses (approximately 19 participants per prime; see Table 5 for exact N 
per cell). 106 of these participants were female and 49 were male; on average, they were 
37.72 years old (SD=11.71). English was the primary language of all participants. 20 
participants held graduate degrees; 64 held college degrees; 68 had a high school diploma; 
and 3 did not finish high school.  
Materials: 
 Evidence Ratings. Measures In order to assess the efficacy of the primes (that is, to 
determine whether a negative prime decreased participants’ trust in that specific evidence, 
and a positive prime increased participants’ trust), we asked participants to rate each form 
of evidence in three ways: 1) how reliable (how often it is correct or wrong; 10=never 
wrong, 0=always wrong); 2) how convincing (how useful it would be for the participant in 
making a guilt determination if they were on a jury; 10=completely convincing, 0=not 
convincing at all) they believed it was. Participants completed this rating twice: once before 
reading the prime, and then again after reading the prime; 3) immediately after reading the 
prime, participants responded to the question: “How did the paragraph you just read affect 
your opinion of [the form of evidence]?” on a scale of -2 to +2 (-2=I trust it a lot less; -1=I 
trust it a little less; 0=no change, I trust it the same; 1=I trust it a little more; 2=I trust it a 
lot more). 
Evidence Primes. We developed eight short vignettes that framed the four pieces of 
evidence we use in our DRM lists and stories (positive and negative versions for confession, 
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DNA, eyewitness, and fingerprint). The positive vignettes explained how the key piece of 
evidence led to a perpetrator of a murder being correctly convicted, while the negative 
vignettes explained how the key piece of evidence led to an innocent person being 
wrongfully convicted of the murder. The vignettes for each evidence form differed in some 
aspects, such as the location of the murder, names of the perpetrator, and how the police 
conducted the preliminary investigation. Across the three samples, we slightly varied the 
content of the vignettes to achieve the desired shifts in reliability, credibility, and opinions 
in the evidence. For example (changes underlined): 
Sample 1 
Tom Watkins, of Milwaukee, WI, was recently convicted of first degree murder after 
a two-day trial. Police identified Watkins as a suspect in the murder of another Milwaukee 
man, Sam Perkins. After Perkins did not report for work for two days, police went to his 
house where they found his body. Police arrested Watkins after a preliminary investigation 
revealed a connection between Watkins and Perkins.  
At trial, Watkins was convicted based primarily on his confession to the crime. The 
jury found Watkins’ confession to be very compelling evidence, because it contained many 
accurate details, and the police gathered it using correct, standard interrogation methods, 
making it very reliable and likely true. Further, the jury heard expert testimony that a 
person will rarely confess to a crime they did not commit. Therefore, Watkins’ confession 
was key in making sure the right person was brought to justice.  
 
Sample 2 
Tom Watkins, of Milwaukee, WI, was recently convicted of first degree murder after 
a two-day trial. Police identified Watkins as a suspect in the murder of another Milwaukee 
man, Sam Perkins. After Perkins did not report for work for two days, police went to his 
house where they found his body. Police arrested Watkins after a preliminary investigation 
revealed a connection between Watkins and Perkins. 
 At trial, Watkins was convicted based primarily on his confession to the crime. The 
jury found Watkins’ confession to be very compelling evidence, because it contained many 
accurate details, and the police gathered it using correct, standard interrogation methods, 
making it very reliable and likely true. Further, the jury heard expert testimony that a 
person will rarely confess to a crime they did not commit. In fact, confessions help to catch 
many perpetrators. Therefore, Watkins’ confession was key in making sure the right person 
was brought to justice.  
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Sample 3 
Tom Watkins, of Milwaukee, WI, was recently convicted of first degree murder after 
a two-day trial. Police identified Watkins as a suspect in the murder of another Milwaukee 
man, Sam Perkins. After Perkins did not report for work for two days, police went to his 
house where they found his body. Police arrested Watkins after a preliminary investigation 
revealed a connection between Watkins and Perkins.  
At trial, Watkins was convicted based primarily on his confession to the crime. The 
jury found Watkins’ confession to be very compelling evidence, because it contained many 
accurate details, and the police gathered it using correct, standard interrogation methods, 
making it very reliable and likely true. Further, the jury heard expert testimony that a 
person will rarely confess to a crime they did not commit. In fact, confessions help to catch 
many perpetrators. After the trial, the judge offered an opinion that a confession is reliable 
and is often correct, as it was in this case. The judge also wrote that confession evidence 
should be very convincing that the defendant committed the crime. Therefore, Watkin's 
confession was key in making sure the right person was brought to justice. 
 
 For a full list of the vignettes, see Appendix I.  
Procedure:  
Sample 1 participants rated all four forms of evidence on their reliability and 
convincingness. Then, they read four of the eight possible primes (two positive and two 
negative, one for each form of evidence, randomized order) and rated how their opinion of 
the evidence changed immediately after each prime. After reading the four primes, 
participants again rated the reliability and convincingness of all four forms of evidence a 
second time before being debriefed.  
 Sample 2 and 3 participants rated only one form of evidence determined by random 
assignment. After rating the evidence’s reliability and convincingness, participants read one 
prime, rated how it affected their opinion of the evidence, and then again rated the 
evidence’s reliability and convincingness before being debriefed. 
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Results: 
To determine whether our primes were successful, we focused on three 
measurements: the change in reliability ratings between pre- and post-prime ratings, the 
change in convincingness ratings between pre- and post-prime ratings, and the post-prime 
ratings of how the primes changed participants’ opinion of the evidence.  
 Sample 1. Our first version of the evidence primes was not successful, but showed 
promise. On some measures, for some of the evidence forms, participants demonstrated 
significant differences between the positive and negative primes (e.g., change in opinion of 
DNA, confession reliability and convincingness); however in some cases, the differences 
were not significantly different between positive and negative primes (eyewitness 
reliability and credibility) or the differences were negatively skewed. For example, despite 
significant differences between groups, participants rated DNA reliability, DNA 
convincingness, fingerprint reliability, and fingerprint convincingness more negatively after 
viewing the positive prime (Table 3). 
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Table 3 
Study 3a Sample 1 Priming Pilot Evidence Ratings 
 
Evidence Type 
Priming 
Quality (N) 
Trust in 
Evidence 
 
∆Reliability 
 
∆Convincingness 
Confession Positive (34) 0.23 (0.73) 0.20 (1.57) 0.06 (1.43 
 Negative (35) -0.62 (0.88) -0.88 (1.59) -0.79 (1.61) 
DNA Positive (34) 0.12 (0.92) -0.44 (1.16) -0.21(1.10) 
 Negative (35) -0.51 (0.84) -1.63 (2.66) -1.37 (2.30) 
Eyewitness Positive (35) 0.15 (0.82) 0.32 (1.41) 0.15 (1.74) 
 Negative (34) -0.66 (0.87) -0.26 (1.36) -0.71 (1.98) 
Fingerprint Positive (35) 0.37 (0.73) -2.00 (2.44) -0.51 (1.42) 
 Negative (34) -0.79 (0.77) -3.26 (2.70) -1.50 (1.54) 
Note. Bolded values are significantly different (p<.05) between the Positive and Negative 
groups.  
 
Our method, however, presented a potential confound for these variables. Because 
participants viewed four primes and rating all four forms of evidence, we suspected that it 
was possible the primes were interacting in such a way as to decrease perceived credibility 
of all forms of evidence, not just those in the negative primes. For example, participants 
may have read the negative DNA prime and thought if DNA can be flawed, all evidence can 
be flawed. Therefore, we decided to collect another sample with two alterations. First, we 
tweaked the wording of our primes (see Appendix I). Second, we only showed participants 
one prime and had them rate only the relevant form of evidence; thus, they were not (with 
or without awareness) comparing one form of evidence to another. 
 Sample 2. Overall, the adjustments to the procedure (only one prime) and tweaks to 
the wording of the primes moved us closer to effective primes. As seen below (Table 4), all 
primes resulted in rating changes in the correct direction. Unfortunately, many of the 
ratings were not significantly different between participants in the positive prime and 
participants in the negative prime groups. Additionally, some of the primes yielded no 
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change in ratings (e.g., positive prime confession reliability, and positive prime DNA 
reliability). One possible reason for such small, sometimes non-existent, differences for the 
credibility and convincingness scores was that the pre-prime rating of these aspects was 
anchoring the post-prime ratings. As such, we only measured post-prime ratings in Sample 
3, and again tweaked the wording of our primes in the hope of strengthening the effect.  
Table 4 
 
Study 3a Sample 2 Priming Pilot Evidence Ratings 
 
Evidence Type 
Priming 
Quality (N) 
Trust in 
Evidence 
 
∆Reliability 
 
∆Convincingness 
Confession Positive (7) 0.57 (0.54) 0.00 (1.41) -0.14 (1.35) 
 Negative (9) -0.78 (-0.78) -1.11 (1.27) -0.78 (0.97) 
DNA Positive (9) 0.00 (0.50) 0.00 (0.00) -0.11 (0.78) 
 Negative (7) -1.00 (0.58) -3.29 (2.36) -3.00 (2.24) 
Eyewitness Positive (7) -0.13 (0.99) 0.13 (1.55) 0.25 (0.46) 
 Negative (8) -0.73 (1.01) -1.45 (2.84) -2.18 (3.16) 
Fingerprint Positive (8) 0.38 (0.92) 0.00 (0.93) 0.25 (1.67) 
 Negative (8) -0.75 (0.71) -1.25 (1.75) -1.38 (2.26) 
 
Note. Bolded values are significantly different (p<.05) between the Positive and Negative 
groups.  
 
Sample 3. As seen below (Table 5), the third iteration of our priming paragraphs 
were successful in creating differences between the positive- and negative-prime for each 
form of evidence. Because we no longer measured pre- and post-prime ratings, the goal for 
credibility and convincingness ratings was that the positive-prime participants rated the 
evidence higher than the negative-prime participants: indeed, for every form of evidence 
we found this trend. Further, negative-prime participants remarked that they trusted the 
evidence less, whereas positive-prime participants expressed trusting the evidence more. 
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Table 5 
Study 3a Sample 3 Priming Pilot Evidence Ratings 
 
Evidence Type 
Priming Type 
(N) 
Trust in 
Evidence 
 
Reliability 
 
Convincingness 
Confession Positive (21) 0.38 (0.87) 7.24 (1.81) 7.29 (2.31) 
 Negative (14) -0.93 (0.83) 4.00 (2.11) 5.79 (2.87) 
DNA Positive (18) 0.22 (0.94) 7.94 (1.63) 7.72 (1.67) 
 Negative (21) -0.76 (0.89) 6.81 (1.83) 6.62 (1.75) 
Eyewitness Positive (18) -0.22 (0.65) 6.61 (2.17) 6.50 (2.33) 
 Negative (21) -1.14 (0.79) 3.00 (2.74) 3.10 (2.51) 
Fingerprint Positive (20) 0.35 (1.04) 8.15 (1.69) 7.30 (2.08) 
 Negative (22) -1.05 (0.76) 4.86 (2.36) 4.45 (2.18) 
 
Note. Bolded values are significantly different (p<.05) between the Positive and Negative 
groups.  
 
Discussion:  
It is worth mentioning that in a few cases, the primes were not successful according 
to strict statistical convention. For instance, the positive- and negative-primes did not 
result in significant differences for confession convincingness (p=.096), and DNA 
convincingness (p=.052). This finding is not completely surprising: Given that DNA and 
confessions are seen as strong indicators of guilt, it logically follows that a single vignette 
may do little to shift participants’ opinion of the evidence’s credibility as a whole. Similarly, 
the eyewitness positive prime produced slightly negative change for participants’ opinion 
of the evidence after reading the vignette—even though it was significantly higher than 
positive participants’ ratings. But again, this result does not necessarily invalidate the 
usefulness of the prime: it is a very small negative rating (M=-0.22 on a 2 to -2 scale). 
Further, because eyewitnesses lead to so many wrongful convictions, our participants may 
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be inherently skeptical of any court case in which an eyewitness is the only piece of 
evidence, making it unlikely they will form more positive views of eyewitness evidence. 
 These minor problems aside, we believed that Sample 3 provided sufficient 
evidence to warrant use of these primes in Study 3b, in which we measured how priming 
evidence quality information influences responses to our evidence “guilty” DRM lists. 
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CHAPTER 13: STUDY 3B 
Design:  
Between-subjects 3(Prime Type: positive, negative, neutral) x 4(Evidence DRM list: 
confession, DNA, fingerprint, eyewitness) + 1 (no-prime control list). 
Participants:  
We recruited 804 participants for Study 3b. Of these, 150 were excluded for failure 
to follow directions and/or technical issues, leaving 654 participants for analyses 
(approximately 50 participants per cell). An a-prior power analysis calculated this sample 
size was sufficient to detect a small main effect (f=0.15) with 80% power. Participants had 
an average age of 38.07 years (SD=13.09); 426 were female and 228 were male. 94 held a 
graduate degree, 285 a college degree, 274 a high school diploma, and 1 did not complete 
high school. English was the primary language of all but 5 participants; however, these 5 
participants responded to the free recall and free response sections of the study with good 
grammar and without any errors. 
Of our final 654 participants, 127 reported having served on a jury, and 146 
reported having a close friend or family member convicted of a felony. Separate analyses 
were performed for these subgroups, and they did not vary from each other, their 
counterpart subgroups, or the overall sample for any of our analyses. Thus, we report the 
combined data. 
Materials: 
 Positive and Negative Evidence Primes. Participants (except Control group) read one 
of eight possible primes (positive or negative for confession, DNA, eyewitness, or 
fingerprint) developed in Study 3a (See Appendix I). 
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 Filler Vignettes. In order to disguise the link between the prime and subsequent 
DRM list, the experimentally-relevant evidence prime was embedded between two 
unrelated, but stylistically similar, filler primes (See Appendix I). 
 “Guilty” DRM List. Each participant read one of five possible 7-word “Guilty” DRM 
lists— a Control List, Confession List, DNA List, Eyewitness List, or Fingerprint List. These 
five lists were the same 7-word list developed and used in Study 1 (Appendix C). 
 For the instructions and construction of the memory measures, see Appendix L. 
Procedure: 
Participants agreed to participate in what they told was an MTurk HIT composed of 
two separate studies. In fact, the two studies were related: Part I was the Priming Phase, 
and Part 2 was the DRM Phase. This method of ostensibly running two unrelated studies 
has proven successful in the past for our lab (Lawson, 2014) at disguising the purpose of 
primes from participants. After providing informed consent, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the 13 possible experimental cells, which dictated which priming 
paragraph and which evidence “guilty” DRM list they saw. 
In the Priming Phase, participants read an evidence priming paragraph (determined 
by their group assignment), preceded and followed by similar, but unrelated, filler 
paragraphs to maintain the cover story. Participants in the Control group and neutral prime 
conditions read only the filler paragraphs. 
After completing the Priming Phase, participants read a brief explanation of “the 
second study” to maintain the cover story. After reading the instructions, participants 
completed the DRM Phase, which was identical to the “guilty” list portion of Study 1b. 
Participants viewed one of the five possible lists that corresponded to the evidence in the 
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priming vignette from the Priming Phase (Control participants viewed the control list). For 
example, participants who were in the Positive Confession and Negative Confession 
conditions read different primes, but both viewed the “guilty” DRM list containing 
“confession.” After viewing the 7-word “guilty” list, participants completed a five-minute 
filler task, followed by a Free Recall memory test and a Recognition Test in which 
participants rated words as Old or New, rated their confidence in their decision, and made 
a “remember”, “know”, or “guess” judgment if they judged a word as “Old.” After completing 
the memory tests, participants answered the exclusionary questions, including what they 
thought the study was about, and then were debriefed. 
Hypotheses: 
H10: There will be a main effect for Prime Type, such that participants in the positive 
prime condition will show more false alarms (both free and recognition) for “guilty,” higher 
confidence for “guilty,” and more “remember” judgments than the participants who in the 
no prime condition, which in turn will show more false alarms, higher confidence, and more 
“remember” judgments than those in the negative prime condition. 
H11: There will also be a main effect for Evidence DRM List, such that participants 
who read the Confession or DNA list will show more false alarms (both free and 
recognition) for “guilty,” higher confidence for “guilty,” and more “remember” judgments 
than the participants who read the Eyewitness or Fingerprint list, which in turn will show 
more false alarms, higher confidence, and more “remember” judgments than those in the 
Control list condition. 
H12: There will be a significant Prime Type x Evidence DRM List interaction, such that 
participants who read the Eyewitness or Fingerprint list will be more affected by the 
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positive and negative primes than participants who read the Confession or DNA lists. That 
is, participants who read the Eyewitness or Fingerprint list will show greater (or fewer) 
false alarms, greater (or less) confidence for “guilty,” and more (or fewer) “remember” 
judgments compared to those in the corresponding neutral prime conditions than those 
who read the Confession or DNA lists.  
Based on our previous work, we expect these differences between groups to be 
small effect sizes (Cohen’s d=0.20). Further, we expect small main effects as well (Cohen’s 
f=0.25) 
Results: 
 For Free Recall, Recognition Test, and Confidence Judgment results, data were 
submitted to a 3(prime type: positive, negative, neutral) x 4 (evidence type: confession, DNA, 
eyewitness, fingerprint) ANOVA. These analyses tested for the hypothesized Priming main 
effect, Evidence List main effect, and Priming*Evidence List interaction. Because there was 
no Control list equivalent to a positive or negative prime (focusing on the credibility aspect 
of a single word on the list), we could not fully factorially-cross the Control condition, and 
thus excluded it from analyses.  
Free Response Overall, Free Response rates of “guilty” were fairly low: maximum 
MControl=0.18, 95% CI=[.07, .028],  MEyewitnessNegative=0.18, 95% CI=[.07, .29], and 
MFingerprintNegative=0.18, 95% CI=[.07, .29]: minimum MDNA=0.04, 95% CI=[0.00, 0.10]. These 
free recall rates are much lower than those found in Study 2b, but similar to those found in 
Study 1b—a trend that is not surprising, given that we used the 7-word list format rather 
than the story format. 
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We found no support for a main effect of Prime Type, F(2, 591)=1.79, p=.169; no 
main effect of Evidence List, F(3, 591)=0.36, p=.784; and no interaction between Prime 
Type and Evidence List, F(6, 591)=1.18, p=.313.  
 
Figure 8. Study 3b Proportion of “guilty” responses to Free Recall Test 
 
In order to investigate the possibility that priming may have affected some forms of 
evidence more than others, we conducted a number of follow-up t-tests. Specifically, we 
compared the free recall of “guilty” between the positive and negative conditions for each 
evidence list. This resulted in four t-tests: Positive and Negative Confession; Positive and 
Negative DNA; Positive and Negative Eyewitness; and Positive and Negative Fingerprint. We 
reasoned that if priming had any effect on the activation of guilty, these comparisons would 
be the most likely place to detect a significant difference. However, all of these t-tests 
yielded non-significant results (p=[.130, .752]; See Appendix K). In fact, the highest rates of 
guilty free recall occurred in the Negative Eyewitness and Negative Fingerprint conditions. 
Thus, we found no support for any of our hypotheses in the Free Recall responses. 
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Recognition Judgments Similar to the Free Recall rates, the Old/New judgments for 
this study were similar to those in Study 1b; maximum: MPositiveConfession=0.74, 95% CI=[.61, 
.87]; minimum: MNegativeEyewitness=0.52, 95% CI=[.38, .66] (Figure 9). 
Similar to Free Recall results, we found no support for our hypotheses. There was 
no main effect of Prime Type, F(2, 591)=1.13, p=.325, no main effect of Evidence List, F(3, 
591)=0.74, p=.528, nor a significant interaction between Prime Type and Evidence List, F(6, 
591)=0.14, p=.737. We again conducted comparison t-tests between the Positive and 
Negative conditions for each form of evidence. None of these tests yielded significant 
differences, p=[.060, .742]. It does bear mentioning that these data trend in the predicted 
direction, however. Participants in the positive priming conditions false alarmed to guilty 
more than participants in the negative priming conditions for the Confession lists 
(MPositiveConfession=0.74, 95% CI=[.61, .87], MNegativeConfession=0.56, 95% CI=[.42, .70]; 
t(98)=1.90, p=.060), DNA lists (MPositiveDNA=0.62, 95% CI=[.48, .76], MNegativeDNA=0.56, 95% 
CI=[.42, .70]; t(98)=0.61, p=.547), and Eyewitness lists (MPositiveEyewitness=0.60, 95% CI=[.46, 
.74], MNegativeEyewitness=0.52, 95% CI=[.38, .66]; t(98)=0.80, p=.425). Participants who saw the 
Fingerprint list showed the opposite pattern, (MPositiveFingerprint=0.61, 95% CI=[.47, .75], 
MNegativeFingerprint=0.64, 95% CI=[.50, .78]; t(98)=0.33, p=.742). Although, again, these 
differences are not significant, they suggest that priming may more reliably influence 
Old/New judgments than Free Recall judgments.   
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Figure 9. Study 3b proportion of “Old” responses on Recognition Test 
 
Confidence Judgments. Confidence judgments were similar to those in Study 1b, 
ranging from a maximum: MControl=3.98, 95% CI=[3.67, 4.29], to minimum: 
MNegativeFingerprint=3.33, 95% CI=[2.96, 3.71]. We found no significant main effect for Prime 
Type, F(2, 591)=0.67, p=.499, no main effect for Evidence List, F(3, 591)=0.40, p=.754, and 
no significant Prime Type * Evidence List interaction, F(6, 591)=1.51, p=.173. Follow-up t-
tests between the Positive and Negative conditions for each form of evidence also yielded 
no significant differences: p=[.122, .719] (Appendix K). Thus, we found no support for any 
of our hypotheses. 
Interestingly, participants in the positive prime conditions expressed the lowest 
confidence compared to their neutral and negative counterparts for the Confession lists, 
Eyewitness lists, and Fingerprint lists. Participants in the positive DNA condition, on the 
other hand, expressed higher confidence than those in the neutral DNA or negative DNA 
conditions. Although none of these differences are statistically significant, it a surprising 
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trend that the priming conditions we expected to yield the highest confidence in 
recognition for “guilty” in fact yield the lowest (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10. Study 3b confidence for Recognition Test responses to “guilty” 
 
R/K/G Results. Due to the ordinal nature of the remember/know/guess responses 
and the two multi-level independent variables, the chi-square test used for Studies 1B and 
2B was not an appropriate statistical test to use here. Specifically, we are interested in the 
possibility of the interaction between Prime Type and Evidence List. Therefore, we 
performed an ordinal regression with our independent variables, Prime Type and Evidence 
List, as our predictors. This ordinal regression yielded a poor model fit for the data, 
χ2(11)=7.19, p=.784. Indeed, the pseudo R-square revealed the model explained very little 
of the variance (Nagelkerke R2 = .022), while the Test of Parallel Lines provided no 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the location parameters differed as a function of 
experimental assignment (χ2(11)=10.16, p=.516). Therefore, we can conclude that neither 
the Prime Type nor the Evidence List affected the phenomenological strength of false 
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recognition of “guilty.” Further, there was no evidence of any interaction of the two 
independent variables (Table 6). 
Table 6 
Study 3b R/K/G Ratings for “Old” guilty ratings 
  Positive   Neutral   Negative  
List Type R K G R K G R K G 
Control - - - 14 8 8 - - - 
Confession 13 14 10 11 9 9 11 9 8 
DNA 14 9 8 12 10 12 7 12 9 
Eyewitness 9 11 10 10 13 5 11 8 7 
Fingerprint 10 9 12 11 6 16 10 14 8 
 
Discussion:  
 Despite previous research showing strong effects of priming influencing how people 
respond to DRM lists (Lenton, et al., 2001; Takarangi et al., 2007), we found no support that 
our evidence quality primes affected the activation of the “guilty” semantic network. 
Participants did not show shifts in falsely recalling or recognizing “guilty,” nor did they 
show any changes in confidence or phenomenological memory quality as a result of being 
positively or negatively primed. Further, all four of our evidence forms showed no 
susceptibility to priming. 
 There are several explanations for why we saw no effects here. One possibility is 
that our primes, although successful in influencing explicit ratings of evidence quality, may 
have lost their potency by the time participants viewed the DRM list. In pilot testing, 
participants rated the evidence immediately after viewing the prime. However in Study 3b, 
participants read a filler prime and DRM instructions before viewing the list, resulting in 
approximately three minutes elapsing between the prime and reading the list, and over 
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eight minutes between the prime and the free recall test. It may be that the admittedly 
small effects we measured in pilot testing were insufficient to influence semantic activation 
while viewing the list; it is also possible that the effects of the primes we did observe in 3a 
were too short-lived and were thus over by the time participants viewed the list. 
 Another possibility is that changing the relationship between one word (the 
evidence word) and guilty is not a strong enough effect to influence overall semantic 
activation. Indeed, past research has primed the entire theme of the list; Lenton et al. 
(2001) primed gender expectations, and Takarangi et al., (2007) primed violence. Here, we 
focused our prime on a single word. If our speculation accounting for the lack of list 
differences in Studies 1 and 2 is true that changing one word has a small, even negligible 
effect on semantic activation, it also stands to reason that strengthening or weakening a 
single word will also have no effect. 
 Our data did show several trends worth noting. First, negative and positive primes 
did show the predicted trend for Recognition Test responses. Specifically, participants in 
the Positive Confession condition false alarmed to “guilty” far more often than participants 
in the Negative Confession condition. Although the t-test was not significant, it is possible 
this result would be significant with more participants. Here we had only 50 participants 
per group, whereas in past research we use 200 participants per cell. Given the exploratory 
nature of this experiment, future research could use these results as a guide for more 
specific, greater-powered use of this paradigm. 
 Despite the lack of significant findings here, we believe this paradigm is ripe for 
further research. For example, our research question here was whether priming affected 
the semantic relationship between a specific form of evidence and guilt. What we do not 
79 
AUTOMATICALLY GUILTY 
 
know is how priming may affect the “guilty” list in general. For example, would more 
thematic (as opposed to single word) priming influence activation of guilty? Perhaps 
instead of focusing on a single form of evidence, a priming paragraph could depict a more 
detailed right (positive) or wrongful (negative) conviction. If more globally-thematic 
priming influences activation of guilty, how would such priming compare to priming other, 
more traditional DRM lists?  
  
80 
AUTOMATICALLY GUILTY 
 
CHAPTER 14: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Because evidence sometimes leads to a conviction despite overwhelming proof of 
innocence, we suspect that certain forms of evidence are strongly associated with guilt. As 
such, hearing strongly guilt-associated evidence automatically and strongly activates the 
thought of guilt—and later, people may remember “guilty” rather than the actual evidence. 
Here, we tested for such automatic association with the DRM paradigm (Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995) in a novel way. Specifically, we asked participants to read a group of 
words related to “guilty” (but not “guilty” itself). Then, on a memory test for the words they 
saw, participants incorrectly report seeing “guilty” because of a semantic activation error: 
all of the “guilty”-related words activate the semantic network containing “guilty” and 
participants mistake thinking of “guilty” for actually having read it. The stronger the 
connection between the words participant read and “guilty,” the more likely they are to 
falsely recall reading “guilty.” Therefore, the rate of false recall is an indirect measure of the 
strength of automatic association—a measure we can use to detect the strength of 
automatic association between evidence and guilt. 
In this set of studies, we had participants read our “guilty” list, but varied a single 
word between participants: namely, one form of evidence. Activation monitoring theory 
suggests that participants who read the group of words containing evidence strongly 
associated with “guilty” would falsely report having read “guilty” more than participants 
reading more weakly associated evidence. For instance, if our hypothesis was correct, 
participants reading “confession” (which often results in a conviction, even when it should 
not; Kassin & Neumann, 1997; Kassin & Sukel, 1997) or “DNA” (the “gold standard” of 
evidence; National Academy of Sciences, 2009) should falsely recall “guilty” very often. 
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Conversely, participants who read “eyewitness” (a form of evidence that is demonstrably 
problematic; National Academy of Sciences, 2014) or “fingerprint” (which follows a general 
methodology, but not always reliable; National Academy of Sciences, 2009) should have 
falsely recalled “guilty” less often. In Study 1, we tested our hypothesis by listing six of our 
“guilty” words and one form of evidence (the 7-word list format). In Study 2, we embedded 
the six “guilty” words and one evidence word in a paragraph about the criminal justice 
system (the “DRM Story” format) to increase the contextual information and potentially 
alter activation of “guilty.” Finally, in Study 3, we influenced context in a different way by 
providing participants with a vignette that described a piece of evidence as either reliable, 
good evidence or unreliable, flawed evidence. We used this positive or negative 
information to make that form of evidence more or less associated with “guilty,” —a shift 
which, we expected, would be detectable using the DRM paradigm. 
This is, to our knowledge, the first attempt at using the DRM as a tool to specifically 
measure automatic associations. Although researchers have used the DRM variations we 
used here (a 7-word list, Gallo, 2010; the DRM Story format, Dewhurst, Pursglove, & Lewis, 
2007; and using priming to alter the association network, Lenton, et al., 2001; Takarangi et 
al., 2007), we had to adapt each approach for a “guilty” DRM list. Each of our new DRM 
iterations successfully caused participants to falsely recall seeing “guilty” at rates similar to 
established lists that exhibit very strong DRM effects (e.g. “sleep”). However, in each of our 
studies, we detected no differences in false free recall, false recognition alarms, confidence, 
or remember/know/guess judgments between participants who saw different evidence 
lists. The single exception to this was the free recall rates for the “DNA” Story from Study 
2b, which produced significantly higher false recall rates for “guilty” than the Control and 
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Eyewitness Stories. Despite this singular success, simply put, we found little evidence to 
support our hypotheses that different forms of evidence (confession and DNA) would yield 
higher false recall for “guilty” in our applications of the DRM paradigm. 
Why did we fail to detect changes in response in the DRM paradigm? One possibility 
is that the associations between different form of evidence and guilt are not as automatic as 
we suspected, and instead require additional cognition in order to create the association. 
However, if this were the case, we would expect lists that contain a form of evidence would 
generate lower false recall rates than the control list, due to weakening the semantic 
activation with a non-associated word. Secondly, we would expect that participants who 
view information cuing the context of the criminal justice system (e.g., the “guilty” story, 
and the positive and negative evidence primes) would activate “guilty” and thus show 
higher false recall for “guilty” than participants who did not receive such information.  In 
both cases, we did not find such a trend. Participants regularly responded with high rates of 
false alarms to the “guilty” DRM list and story. Further, participants receiving additional 
contextual information did not respond with more false recall than those that did not. 
Notably, participants who viewed the “guilty” DRM story had far more false memories for 
“guilty” in the free recall portion than did participants who viewed the list format; 
however, the rates of recognition false alarms were extremely similar. If there were no 
association, participants in the different Neutral priming conditions should show fewer 
false memories and false alarms than those in the Negative priming condition—a trend we 
did not find. Thus, we are confident the association is automatic, but the paradigms we 
used here were insufficient to measure it. What remains unclear, however, is whether 
different forms of evidence form automatic associations that differ in strength with “guilty.” 
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There are a number of potential explanations for why we failed to measure 
differential association strengths between different evidence and guilt. One explanation is 
that the one-word alteration we use here is insufficient to change the activation strength of 
“guilty.” Simply put, the network is activated by the first few words on the list immediately, 
and remaining words do little to shift the activation strength. As such, the evidence 
embedded in the middle of the list or story has a negligible effect on the overall activation 
strength. We find this explanation to be the most probable for two reasons. First, it seems 
that the effect of evidence type on activation strength is extremely weak, rather than non-
existent. Throughout our studies we found results that trend in the hypothesized 
distribution of false recall, despite non-significant effects. This trend suggests that the 
differential association strengths with “guilty” are ever-so-slightly pushing false recall rates 
in the expected direction (up for confession and DNA; down for fingerprint and 
eyewitness). We are not saying, of course, that our hypotheses are true despite lack of 
statistical significance. Indeed, that each study finds a hypothesized trend in a different 
measurement, but these do not replicate across studies does little to paint a clear picture. 
For example, participants who saw the Confession List in Study 1b and the “positive 
confession” prime and list in Study 3b reported more false alarms to “guilty” on the 
Recognition Test than their counterparts; however, in Study 2b, Confession Story 
participants produced among the lowest recognition false alarms. In Study 2b, the DNA 
Story produced the most false memories on the Free Recall test, significantly more than the 
Confession Story and Fingerprint Story but this finding did not replicate across any other 
studies or memory measures. Thus, there seems to be an effect of evidence type on 
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semantic activation—but it is of small size and large variability, and therefore extremely 
difficult to pinpoint. 
The trend in priming results from Study 3b provides a second potential reason for 
why a single evidence word is insufficient to shift activation strength. Although we found 
no main effect for priming, the Recognition Test results do show a general trend towards 
more false alarms for the positive primes than the negative primes, albeit not at a 
significant level. These results suggest that our use of the DRM paradigm is capable of 
detecting changes in association strength. Particularly, it seems that the DNA list may have 
been more resistant to priming than other forms of evidence—a trend we predicted 
because the association with guilt is very difficult to move, given that DNA is so widely-
trusted and reliable. On the other hand, confession, eyewitness, and fingerprint generally 
had higher false alarm rates for the positive prime conditions than the negative prime 
conditions. Perhaps if the study were more highly powered, the differences between 
positive and negative priming conditions would become significant for confession, 
eyewitness, and fingerprint, but not for DNA. Again, although this is purely speculative, the 
results suggest that some forms of evidence yield different false recall results than others, 
but, notably, to a very small degree.  
Another potential explanation for why we did not observe differential activation 
strength is that the semantic activation is not a reasoning judgment (“That person is 
guilty”) but instead definitional (“Guilt exists in the criminal justice system”). Indeed, 
“innocent” is one of our list words—the opposite of “guilty.” Participants may be activating 
“guilty” in a way that is quite different from a juror making an assessment of a defendant. 
After all, we are aware of no evidence that reading a DRM list affects a person’s judgments 
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or decision-making outside of that DRM task—for example, reading the “sleep” list does not 
make you sleepy, or decide to go to sleep. Study 3b provides weak evidence that supports 
the proposition that the semantic activation of “guilty” is different from determining 
whether someone is guilty. If participants are behaving in the decision-making manner of 
jurors, those in the negative prime conditions who read a vignette of a wrongfully 
convicted person should, activate “innocent” and suppress its opposite, “guilty.” Activating 
“innocent” should lead to lower false recall for “guilty” on the DRM rate. However, we found 
no main effect for Prime Type (nor significant differences between false recall rates for the 
negative and positive for each evidence type), suggesting that both negative and positive 
prime participants were processing the “guilty” list in the same way.  Thus, perhaps 
participants that have cued “guilty” due to spreading activation are thinking of “guilty” in a 
qualitatively different way from jurors who are assessing guilt.  
Future Research 
Despite our lack of significant results, we believe there may yet be hope for using 
the DRM paradigm in this way. Each of our three studies yielded interesting trends, if not 
support for our hypotheses. Study 1 suggests that the forward associative strength of the 
list words may not always predict activation strength of the critical lure; and yet, our 7-
word list still functioned very similarly to the 14-word list structure in terms of false 
alarms and confidence. In Study 2, the Story format yielded surprisingly high rates of Free 
Recall and Recognition test false recall for “guilty.” In Study 3, we found no main effects or 
interactions, but think that a more highly-powered study may yield significant differences 
between the positively- and negatively-primed evidence lists. As such, this project has 
raised a number of new questions that explore how the DRM paradigm works. For example, 
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we wonder if our “guilty” list functions differently from other DRM lists, given the 
surprising effects of weaker-associated words (Study 1) and the high rates of false 
memories and false alarms from the “guilty” Story (Study 2). Are participants processing 
these criminal justice-related words in a way different from other, more concrete DRM 
lists? Although we found our list functioned similarly to the “chair” list and “sleep” story 
(although, in many cases, not identically; See Appendix D and G), future research should 
investigate other aspects that differ between the “guilty” and other DRM lists and stories 
that may account for our unexpected results. 
The lack of priming effects was also surprising, given its success in past research 
(Lenton et al., 2001; Takarangi et al., 2007). As noted previously, these studies primed the 
entire content of the list, whereas we only primed the strength of association between one 
word and the critical lure. We are curious whether single-word priming would affect 
semantic activation for other, traditional DRM lists. Further, we suspect that a prime that 
affects the entirety of the “guilty” list—perhaps using ambiguous guilt-related words 
(Takarangi et al., 2007) would be more effective in altering how participants activate the 
“guilty” network. 
Given the applied nature of this set of studies, a logical next step for this paradigm is 
assessing how it could be used in the real world. Although it is clear that further research is 
necessary before it would be plausible to take this paradigm out of the lab, such future 
research should focus on the specific applied situations for which it is suited—for example, 
how this paradigm can be used as a tool with mock trial designs. We are interested in how 
situational factors influence responses to the “guilty” DRM list and story. Do jurors respond 
differently to the list after a prosecution’s case in chief than after a defense’s? Do individual 
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differences such as being a police officer have an effect? In some cases (Study 1b and Study 
2b), we found contact with the criminal justice system changed our pattern of results. 
Given these comparisons were only a fraction of our required sample size, and significant 
differences are eliminated when combined with the overall sample, we are hesitant to 
interpret them as meaningful. However, these differences suggest contact with the criminal 
justice system may indeed be such an important individual difference. We need a better 
understanding of how the “guilty” DRM list and story works, but we think it has potential 
for real-world application. 
Despite overall lack of support for our hypotheses that we could measure 
differential activation of “guilty” between different forms of evidence, our results do raise a 
number of theoretical and applied research questions for future research. We think that 
our novel use of the extensively-used and well-understood DRM paradigm lays the 
groundwork for a simple, effective tool for understanding a potential cause of wrongful 
conviction.  
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Appendix A 
Forward Associative Task Results 
  
Word List 
Position 
Associative 
Strength 
 Word List 
Position 
Associative 
Strength 
Jury 1 47%  Jail 8 24% 
Crime 2 44%  Murder* 9 17% 
Judge 3 44%  Convict 10 20% 
Court 4 39%  Shame 11 17% 
Criminal 5 27%  Lawyer 12 15% 
Innocent 6 24%  Verdict 13 10% 
Trial 7 24%  Sentence 14 10% 
*”Murder” was listed as the 9th word due to the fact that other specific crimes (robbery, 
stealing, etc.) were occasionally listed by participants.  
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Appendix B 
Exclusion Criteria 
 
Question Excluded if responded… Rationale 
1. Did you complete the experiment in 
a single session, without stopping? 
No Memory confound (unknown decay 
time between list and test) 
2. Did you pause or leave the 
experiment to engage in other tasks? 
Yes Memory confound (unknown decay 
time between list and test) 
3. Did you use your web browser’s 
back or refresh buttons during the 
experiment? 
Yes May have disrupted Qualtrics 
progression and assignment 
4. Did you complete the experiment 
without anyone helping you? 
No Memory confound (memory aid, 
distraction from encoding, etc.) 
5. Did you speak with anyone at any 
time during the experiment? 
Yes Memory confound (memory aid, 
distraction from encoding, etc.) 
5. Did you use a search engine at any 
point to look anything up? 
Yes Memory confound (memory aid, 
distraction from encoding, etc.); in 
Study 3, potential interference with 
primes 
6. Did you take notes? Yes Memory confound (memory aid) 
7. Did you (intentionally or 
unintentionally) rewind or restart the 
video showing the list?* 
Yes Memory confound (multiple exposure 
to words) 
8. Did you experience any of the 
following technical difficulties? Video 
Problems; Survey restarted; Other. 
Please Specify 
Yes for video problems and survey 
restart; “Other” responses were 
assessed by the researcher 
May interfere with Qualtrics group 
assignment; Video Problems may 
affect ability to remember words. 
*Question 7 was not used as an exclusion rule for Study 2, as the Story was not presented in a 
video.  
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Appendix C 
 
Study 1a Word Lists 
 
Guilty List 
 Strong Association: jury, crime, judge, court, criminal, innocent, trial 
 Medium Association: court, criminal, innocent, trial, jail, murder, convict 
 Weak Association: jail, murder, convict, shame, lawyer, verdict, sentence 
  
Medium-Strong: crime, judge, court, criminal, innocent, trial, jail 
  
 Chair List 
 Strong Association: desk, cushion, couch, bench, sit, swivel, sofa 
 Moderate Association: bench, sit, swivel, sofa, recliner, rocking, sitting 
 Weak Association: recliner, rocking, sitting, legs, table, seat, wood 
 
Study 1b Word Lists 
 
 Guilty List 
Control: jury, crime, judge, court, criminal, innocent, trial  
Confession: jury, crime, judge, confession, court, criminal, innocent 
DNA: jury, crime, judge, DNA, court, criminal, innocent 
Eyewitness: jury, crime, judge, eyewitness, court, criminal, innocent 
Fingerprint: jury, crime, judge, fingerprint, court, criminal, innocent 
 
*Guilty Lists containing evidence constructed by dropping “trial” and have the evidence 
word inserted as the fourth word. 
 
Chair List 
Control: desk, cushion, couch, bench, sit, swivel, sofa   
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Appendix D 
Study 1b “Guilty” and “Chair” List Descriptives and Comparisons 
 
Item 
Type 
List Free Recall 
(SD) 
Recognition 
(SD) 
Confidence 
(SD) 
Remember 
(*) 
Know 
(*) 
Guess  
(*) 
Critical 
Lure 
Guilty .08 (.27) .50 (.50) 3.73 (1.19) 174 (.344) 186 
(.369) 
145 
(.287) 
 Chair .43 (.50) .79 (.41) 3.98 (1.13) 399 (.498) 285 
(.355) 
118 
(.147) 
(Proportions) p<.000; 
d=.649 
p<.000; 
d=.506 
p<.000; 
d=.179 
McNemar-Bowker p<.000 
Old Guilty 4.90 (1.45) .91 (.18) 3.54 (0.84) 2.25 (.89) .39 (.74) .10 (.33) 
 Chair - .93 (.17) 4.62 (0.55) 2.26 (.90) .42 (.71) .11 (.35) 
(Counts)  p=.016; 
d=.076 
p<.000; 
d=1.165 
p=.616 p=.243 p=.664 
New Guilty .53 (1.03) .03 (.12) 4.58 (0.69) .01 (.14) .02 (.18) .04 (.27) 
 Chair - .04 (.13) 4.36 (0.90) .02 (.16) .03 (.20) .06 (.30) 
(Counts)  p=.031; 
d=.068 
p<.000; 
d=.286 
p=.446 p=.124 p=.169 
Weak 
Lure 
Guilty - .31 (.46) 3.68 (1.26) 63 (.201) 104 
(.332) 
146 
(.466) 
 Chair - .41 (.49) 3.53 (1.22) 84 (.201) 171 
(.410) 
162 
(.388) 
(Proportions)  p<.000; 
d=.177 
p<.000; 
d=.110 
McNemar-Bowker p<.000 
Notes  
1. Bolded values are those that are significantly different (p<.05) between the two lists. Actual 
p-value and effect size (if applicable) reported below each set of values. 
2. For Critical Lure and Weak Lure Free Recall and Recognition values, we report the 
proportion of participants that indicated they had seen the words on the list—either by 
including it in their Free Recall response, or by selecting “Old” in the Recognition Test. 
3. For Old and New Word Recognition, we report the mean number of those words 
categorized as “Old” on the recognition test. Thus, higher values for Old words indicate higher 
accuracy in categorization; a score of 1.0 would signify categorizing all Old words as “Old.” 
Conversely, lower values for New words indicate higher accuracy in categorization; a score of 
0 would signify categorizing all New words as “New.”  
*4. R/K/G for Critical Lure and Weak Lure, frequencies are reported (e.g., the number of 
participants who responded R/K/G) because participants could only respond with one value.  
5. The value in parentheses for Critical Lure and Weak Lure report the percentage of each 
response type within all “Old” responses. These values were not used for any inferential 
statistics. 
6. For R/K/G Old and New words, the recognition test contained three of each type (e.g., three 
old words, and three new words). Thus, we report the mean number of R responses, K 
responses, and G responses for each participant. Note that these values do not add up to 3 
because only participants who labeled a word as “Old” made a R/K/G judgment. 
*7. The value in parentheses for Old and New Words represents the standard deviation for 
each value.   
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Study 1 “Guilty” Placement Chi Square 
 
X2(8, N=71)=13.00, p=.369. 
  
Condition First Third Middle Third Last Third Total 
Control 0a 0a 17a 17 
Confession 0a 3a 12a 15 
DNA 0a 1a 8a 9 
Eyewitness 1a 4a 10a 15 
Fingerprint 0a 2a 13a 15 
Total 1 10 60 71 
Note: Matching superscript letters indicate categories whose column proportions do not differ 
significantly at p=.05 level.  
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Appendix E 
 
Study 1b t-Tests and Alternate Analyses 
  
 Free Recall 
Group Mean Group Mean t-test p value d value 
Control .09 [.05, .13] Confession .08 [.04, .12] t(404)=0.44 p=.662 d=.03 [.01, .07] 
  DNA .05 [.02, .08] t(408)=1.71 p=.088 d=.16 [.13, .18] 
  EW .07 [.04, .11] t(414)=0.65 p=.518 d=.07 [.05, .10] 
  FP .08 [.04, .12] t(396)=0.31 p=.755 d=.04 [.01, .06] 
Confession .08 [.04, .12] DNA  t(402)=1.27 p=.205 d=.12 [.10, .15] 
  EW  t(412)=0.20 p=.843 d=.04 [.01, .07] 
  FP  t(390)=0.12 p=.904 d=.00 [-.03, .03] 
DNA .05 [.02, .08] EW  t(416)=1.09 p=.277 d=.08 [.06, .12] 
  FP  t(394)=1.39 p=.169 d=.12 [.10, .15] 
EW .07 [.04, .11] FP  t(404)=0.32 p=.750 d=.04 [.01, .06] 
  
 Recognition (Old/New) 
Group Mean Group Mean t-test p value d value 
Control .48 [.41, .55] Confession .53 [.46, .60] t(404)=0.99 p=.321 d=.10 [.05, .15] 
  DNA .46 [.39, .52] t(408)=0.50 p=.617 d=.04 [-.01, .09] 
  EW .51 [.44, .58] t(414)=0.59 p=.557 d=.06 [.01, .11] 
  FP .51 [.44, .58] t(396)=0.59 p=.553 d=.06 [.01, .11] 
Confession .53 [.46, .60] DNA  t(402)=1.49 p=.137 d=.14 [.09, .19] 
  EW  t(412)=0.42 p=.675 d=.04 [-.01, .09] 
  FP  t(390)=0.39 p=.403 d=.04 [-.01, .09] 
DNA .46 [.39, .52] EW  t(416)=1.09 p=.275 d=.10 [.05, .15] 
  FP  t(394)=1.08 p=.279 d=.10 [.05, .15] 
EW .51 [.44, .58] FP  t(404)=0.02 p=.983 d=.00 [-.05, .05] 
  
 Confidence 
Group Mean Group Mean t-test p value d value 
Control 3.83 [3.67, 
3.99] 
Confession 3.60 [3.43, 
3.77] 
t(404)=1.95 p=.052 d=.19 [.08, .31] 
  DNA 3.80 [3.65, 
3.96] 
t(408)=0.23 p=.817 d=.03 [-.08, .14] 
  EW 3.70 [3.53, 
3.86] 
t(414)=1.15 p=.250 d=.11 [.00, .22] 
  FP 3.70 [3.53, 
3.88] 
t(396)=1.05 p=.293 d=.11 [-.01, .23] 
Confession 3.60 [3.43, 
3.77] 
DNA  t(402)=1.77 p=.078 d=.17 [.06, .29] 
  EW  t(412)=0.81 p=.418 d=.08 [-.03, .20] 
  FP  t(390)=0.84 p=.403 d=.08 [-.04, .20] 
DNA 3.80 [3.65, 
3.96] 
EW  t(416)=0.95 p=.344 d=.09 [-.03, .20] 
  FP  t(394)=0.86 p=.393 d=.08 [-.03, .20] 
EW 3.70 [3.53, 
3.86] 
FP  t(404)=0.06 p=.955 d=.00 [-.12, .12] 
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Study 1 Free Recall Chi-Square Alternate Analysis 
 
X2(4, N=1016)=3.09, p=.543. 
  
Condition Absent in FR Present in FR Total 
Control 184a 16a 200 
Confession 187a 19a 206 
DNA 194a 10a 204 
Eyewitness 198a 16a 214 
Fingerprint 176a 16a 192 
Total 939 77 1016 
Note: Matching superscript letters indicate categories whose column proportions do not differ 
significantly at p=.05 level.  
  
 
Study 1 Recognition Test Chi-Square Alternate Analysis 
 
X2(4, N=1016)=2.74, p=.602. 
 
Condition “New” “Old” Total 
Control 107a 99a 206 
Confession 94a 106a 200 
DNA 111a 93a 204 
Eyewitness 105a 109a 214 
Fingerprint 94a 98a 192 
Total 511 505 1016 
Note: Matching superscript letters indicate categories whose column proportions do not differ 
significantly at p=.05 level.  
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Appendix F 
 
Study 2 DRM Story Format 
 
DRM Story Paragraph (14 words): 
A jury1 is a group of normal citizens that reviews information in a case to determine whether a crime2 
has been committed. The judge3 provides order and gives instructions. In some cases, family 
members and interested community members can be present in the court4 as well. If a person loses, 
they will be considered a criminal5. If they win, they are usually innocent6 and show this by the end of 
the trial7. If they lose, they are sent to jail8, especially for murder9. They are also labeled as a convict10, 
which sometimes makes them feel shame11. Of course, a person is not alone – they usually have a 
lawyer12 on their side to argue before the verdict13, as well as help them get a fair sentence14. Thus, 
many people are involved in the system. 
 
DRM Story Paragraph (7 words) Control: 
A jury1 is a group of normal citizens that reviews information in a case to determine whether a crime2 
has been committed. The judge3 provides order and gives instructions. In some cases, family 
members and interested community members can be present in the court4 as well. If a person loses, 
they will be considered a criminal5. If they win, they are usually innocent6 and show this by the end of 
the trial7.  
 
DRM Story Paragraph (7 words) evidence variations: 
A jury1 is a group of normal citizens that reviews information in a case to determine whether a crime2 
has been committed. The judge3 provides order and gives instructions. They also make sure that 
evidence, such as _________4 is presented. In some cases, family members and interested community 
members can be present in the court5 as well. If a person loses, they will be considered a criminal6. If 
they win, they are usually innocent7.  
 
DRM words are italicized and numbered with superscripts.  
 
Sleep Story (14 words): 
Sally lay in bed. She needed to rest but she was still awake even though she was so tired. Finally she 
nodded off and began to dream. She did not want to wake up. She began to snooze and wrapped her 
blanket tightly around her. Sally quickly fell from a doze to a deep slumber and began to snore more 
heavily. Sally lay there in peace until she woke up and let out a big yawn. She was still drowsy. 
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Appendix G 
Study 2b “Guilty” and “Sleep” Story Descriptives and Comparisons 
 
Item 
Type 
Story Free Recall 
(SD) 
Recognition 
(SD) 
Confidence 
(SD) 
Remember 
(*) 
Know 
(*) 
Guess  
(*) 
Critical 
Lure 
Guilty .56 (.50) .87 (.34) 4.40 (.96) 602 (.690) 219 
(.251) 
52 (.060) 
 Sleep .86 (.35) .93 (.25) 4.48 (.85) 678 (.719) 230 
(.244) 
35 (.037) 
(Proportions) p<.000; 
d=.540 
p<.000; 
d=.189 
p=.013; 
d=.078 
McNemar-Bowker p<.000 
Old Guilty 3.66 (1.68) .95 (.17) 4.68 (.56) 2.32 (.97) .43 (.79) .10 (.35) 
 Sleep - .68 (.20) 3.94 (.68) 1.81 (1.2) 1.06 
(1.0) 
.55 (.81) 
(Counts)  p<.000; 
d=1.172 
p<.000; 
d=1.025 
p<.000; 
d=.368 
p<.000; 
d=.530 
p<.000; 
d=.563 
New Guilty - .05 (.14) 4.42 (.62) .03 (.17) .04 (.21) .08 (.32) 
 Sleep - .05 (.14) 4.35 (.71) .07 (.31) .11 (.39) .16 
(.519) 
(Counts)  p=.523 p<.001; 
d=.105 
p<.000; 
d=.117 
p<.000; 
d=.160 
p<.000; 
d=.134 
Weak 
Lure 
Guilty - .42 (.49) 3.62 (1.19) 75 (.180) 186 
(.446) 
156 
(.374) 
 Sleep - .85 (.36) 4.32 (1.01) 613 (.719) 178 
(.207) 
62 (.073) 
(Proportions)  p<.000; 
d=.501 
p<.000; 
d=.540 
McNemar-Bowker p<.000 
Notes  
1. Bolded values are those that are significantly different (p<.05) between the two lists. Actual 
p-value and effect size (if applicable) reported below each set of values. 
2. For Critical Lure and Weak Lure Free Recall and Recognition values, we report the 
proportion of participants that indicated they had seen the words on the list—either by 
including it in their Free Recall response, or by selecting “Old” in the Recognition Test. 
3. For Old and New Word Recognition, we report the mean number of those words 
categorized as “Old” on the recognition test. Thus, higher values for Old words indicate higher 
accuracy in categorization; a score of 1.0 would signify categorizing all Old words as “Old.” 
Conversely, lower values for New words indicate higher accuracy in categorization; a score of 
0 would signify categorizing all New words as “New.”  
*4. R/K/G for Critical Lure and Weak Lure, frequencies are reported (e.g., the number of 
participants who responded R/K/G) because participants could only respond with one value.  
5. The value in parentheses for Critical Lure and Weak Lure report the percentage of each 
response type within all “Old” responses. These values were not used for any inferential 
statistics. 
6. For R/K/G Old and New words, the recognition test contained three of each type (e.g., three 
old words, and three new words for “guilty”; six and six for “sleep”). Thus, we report the mean 
number of R responses, K responses, and G responses for each participant. Note that these 
values do not add up to 3/6 because only participants who labeled a word as “Old” made a 
R/K/G judgment. 
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*7. The value in parentheses for Old and New Words represents the standard deviation for 
each value. 
 
 
Study 2 “Guilty” Placement Chi Square 
 
X2(8, N=566)=16.47, p=.036. 
  
Condition First Third Middle Third Last Third Total 
Control 23a 29ab 53b 114 
Confession 17a 29a 68a 105 
DNA 15a 30a 86a 131 
Eyewitness 13a 22a 65a 100 
Fingerprint 7a 26ab 83b 116 
Total 75 136 355 566 
Note: Matching superscript letters indicate categories whose column proportions do not differ 
significantly at p=.05 level.  
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Appendix H 
Study 2b t-Tests and Alternate Analyses 
 
Free Recall 
Group Mean Group Mean t-test p value d value 
Control .51 [.45, .58] Confession .55 [.49, .62] t(404)=0.80 p=.423 d=.08 [.03, .13] 
  DNA .66 [.59, .72] t(403)=2.92 p=.004 d=.31 [.26, .35] 
  EW .50 [.43, .57] t(402)=0.30 p=.768 d=.02 [-.03, .07] 
  FP .57 [.50, .59] t(404)=1.10 p=.271 d=.12 [.07, .17] 
Confession .55 [.49, .62] DNA  t(401)=2.11 p=.036 d=.23 [.18, .27] 
  EW  t(400)=1.09 p=.275 d=.10 [.05, .15] 
  FP  t(402)=0.30 p=.764 d=.04 [-.01, .09] 
DNA .66 [.59, .72] EW  t(399)=3.21 p=.001 d=.33 [.28, .38] 
  FP  t(401)=1.80 p=.087 d=.17 [.14, .23] 
EW .50 [.43, .57] FP  t(400)=1.39 p=.164 d=.14 [.09, .19] 
 
Recognition (Old/New) 
Group Mean Group Mean t-test p value d value 
Control .84 [.79, .89] Confession .85 [.80, .90] t(404)=0.23 p=.816 d=.03 [-.01, .06] 
  DNA .89 [.84, .93] t(403)=1.25 p=.214 d=.15 [.11, .18] 
  EW .89 [.84, .93] t(402)=1.23 p=.221 d=.15 [.11, .18] 
  FP .86 [.81, .91] t(404)=0.52 p=.605 d=.06 [.09, .02] 
Confession .85 [.80, .90] DNA  t(401)=1.01 p=.313 d=.12 [.09, .15] 
  EW  t(400)=0.99 p=.322 d=.12 [.09, .15] 
  FP  t(402)=0.28 p=.777 d=.03 [-.01, .06] 
DNA .89 [.84, .93] EW  t(399)=0.02 p=.986 d=.00 [-.03, .03] 
  FP  t(401)=0.73 p=.467 d=.09 [.06, .12] 
EW .89 [.84, .93] FP  t(400)=0.71 p=.478 d=.09 [.06, .12] 
 
Confidence 
Group Mean Group Mean t-test p value d value 
Control 4.27 [4.13, 
4.41] 
Confession 4.39 [4.25, 4.52] t(404)=1.18 p=.239 d=.12 [.02, .22] 
  DNA 4.45 [4.32, 4.58] t(403)=1.80 p=.073 d=.18 [.08, .28] 
  EW 4.41 [4.28, 4.54] t(402)=1.42 p=.156 d=.14 [.05, .24] 
  FP 4.47 [4.35, 4.59] t(404)=2.09 p=.037 d=.21 [.14, .30] 
Confession 4.39 [4.25, 
4.52] 
DNA  t(401)=0.65 p=.516 d=.15 [.11, .18] 
  EW  t(400)=0.25 p=.801 d=.06 [-.03, .16] 
  FP  t(402)=0.92 p=.358 d=.09 [.00, .18] 
DNA 4.45 [4.32, 
4.58] 
EW  t(399)=0.40 p=.691 d=.04 [-.05, .14] 
  FP  t(401)=0.25 p=.806 d=.02 [-.07, .11] 
EW 4.47 [4.35, 
4.59] 
FP  t(400)=0.66 p=.510 d=.07 [-.02, .16] 
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Study 2b Free Recall Chi-Square Alternate Analysis 
 
X2(4, N=1009)=12.34, p=.015. 
 
Condition Absent in FR Present in FR Total 
Control 99a 105a 204 
Confession 90a 112a 202 
DNA 69a 132b 201 
Eyewitness 100a 100a 200 
Fingerprint 87a 115a 202 
Total 445 564 1009 
Note: Matching subscript letters indicate categories whose column proportions do not differ 
significantly at p=.05 level.  
 
 
Study 2b Recognition Test Chi-Square Alternate Analysis 
 
X2(4, N=1009)=2.59, p=.629. 
 
Condition “New” “Old” Total 
Control 32a 172a 204 
Confession 30a 172a 202 
DNA 23a 178a 201 
Eyewitness 23a 177a 200 
Fingerprint 28a 174a 202 
Total 136 873 1009 
  
100 
AUTOMATICALLY GUILTY 
 
Appendix I 
Study 3b Evidence Prime Vignettes 
We report here the final version of each vignette. These vignettes were piloted across three 
samples, with content added to each sample. The content added to the second version 
(Sample 2) is demarcated by an underline; the content added to the third version (Sample 
3) is italicized.  
 
Confession – Positive 
Tom Watkins, of Milwaukee, WI, was recently convicted of first degree murder after a two-day trial. 
Police identified Watkins as a suspect in the murder of another Milwaukee man, Sam Perkins. After 
Perkins did not report for work for two days, police went to his house where they found his body. 
Police arrested Watkins after a preliminary investigation revealed a connection between Watkins 
and Perkins. 
 
At trial, Watkins was convicted based primarily on his confession to the crime. The jury found 
Watkins’ confession to be very compelling evidence, because it contained many accurate details, and 
the police gathered it using correct, standard interrogation methods, making it very reliable and 
likely true. Further, the jury heard expert testimony that a person will rarely confess to a crime they 
did not commit. After the trial, the judge offered an opinion that a confession is reliable and is often 
correct, as it was in this case. The judge also wrote that confession evidence should be very 
convincing that the defendant committed the crime.  Therefore, Watkins’ confession was key in 
making sure the right person was brought to justice.  
 
Confession – Negative 
Tom Watkins, of Milwaukee, WI, was recently exonerated after being wrongfully convicted of first 
degree murder based on improper evidence. Police identified Watkins as a suspect in the murder of 
another Milwaukee man, Sam Perkins. After Perkins did not report for work for two days, police 
went to his house where they found his body. Police arrested Watkins after a preliminary 
investigation revealed a connection between Watkins and Perkins. 
 
At trial, Watkins was convicted based primarily on his confession to the crime. The jury found 
Watkins’ confession to be very compelling evidence, despite it containing many inaccurate details, 
and the police gathering it using problematic, coercive interrogation methods, making it unreliable 
and likely false. Further, the jury heard expert testimony that a person will often confess to a crime 
they did not commit. After the trial, the judge offered an opinion that a confession is not always reliable 
and can be incorrect, as it was in this case. The judge also wrote that confession evidence should not 
be completely convincing that the defendant committed the crime. Therefore, Watkins’ confession 
was key in his wrongful conviction. 
 
DNA – Positive 
After a three-day trial, Andrew Simpson was recently convicted of first degree murder. Police 
discovered the body of a man from Omaha, Nebraska, named Timothy Rico, in a dumpster behind a 
convenience store. The police identified Simpson as a person of interest after discovering he worked 
with Rico in the convenience store. After the police located Simpson, he was arrested and charged 
with the crime. 
 
At trial, Simpson was convicted based primarily on his DNA being found on Rico’s body. The jury 
found the DNA to be very compelling evidence because the DNA sample was appropriately gathered, 
using the correct, standard methods, and analyzed accurately, making the match very reliable. 
Further, the jury heard expert testimony that DNA found on a body is rarely from someone other 
than the killer. After the trial, the judge offered an opinion that DNA evidence is reliable and is often 
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correct, as it was in this case. The judge also wrote that DNA evidence should be very convincing that 
the defendant committed the crime.  Therefore, Simpson’s DNA was key in making sure the right 
person was brought to justice. 
 
 
 
DNA – Negative 
A judge recently overturned Andrew Simpson’s conviction, based on admittance of improper 
evidence. Previously, after a three-day trial, Andrew Simpson was wrongly convicted of first degree 
murder. Police discovered the body of a man from Omaha, Nebraska, named Timothy Rico, in a 
dumpster behind a convenience store. The police identified Simpson as a person of interest after 
discovering he worked with Rico in the convenience store. After the police located Simpson, he was 
arrested and charged with the crime.  
 
At trial, Simpson was convicted based primarily on flawed evidence that his DNA was found on Rico’s 
body. The jury found the DNA to be very compelling evidence, despite it being incorrectly gathered, 
and analyzed using an untested method that was shown to produce inaccuracies, making the match 
very unreliable. Further, the jury heard expert testimony that DNA found on a body is commonly 
from someone other than the killer. After the trial, the judge offered an opinion that DNA is not always 
reliable and can be incorrect, as it was in this case. The judge also wrote that DNA evidence should not 
be completely convincing that the defendant committed the crime. Therefore, Simpson’s DNA was 
key in his wrongful conviction.  
 
Eyewitness – Positive 
A Kansas City man named Robert Keller was convicted of first degree murder this week. Neighbors 
discovered the body of Rick Alleto in his truck, parked outside his own home, apparently the victim 
of a gunshot wound to the head. After speaking with neighbors, the police arrested Keller on 
suspicion of murder. After a week-long investigation, the prosecutor formally charged Keller with the 
homicide.  
 
At trial, Keller was convicted based primarily on testimony from an eyewitness who said he saw 
Keller leaving Alleto’s house. The jury found the eyewitness’s identification to be very compelling 
evidence, because the police used proper, unbiased lineup procedures, and the eyewitness expressed 
high confidence in his identification, making it very reliable. Further, the jury heard expert testimony 
that under the circumstances surrounding Alleto’s death, the eyewitness had a good view of the 
defendant and would be able to make an accurate identification. After the trial, the judge offered an 
opinion that an eyewitness is reliable and is often correct, as it was in this case. The judge also wrote 
that eyewitness evidence should be very convincing that the defendant committed the crime. 
Therefore, the eyewitness testimony was key in making sure the right person was brought to justice.  
 
Eyewitness - Negative 
A Kansas City man named Robert Keller was exonerated this week after being wrongfully convicted 
of first degree murder based on improper evidence. Neighbors discovered the body of Rick Alleto in 
his truck, parked outside his own home, apparently the victim of a gunshot wound to the head. After 
speaking with neighbors, the police arrested Keller on suspicion of murder. After a week-long 
investigation, the prosecutor formally charged Keller with the homicide.  
 
At trial, Keller was convicted based primarily on testimony from an eyewitness who said he saw 
Keller leaving Alleto’s house. The jury found the eyewitness’s identification to be very compelling 
evidence, despite the police having used faulty, contaminated lineup procedures, and the eyewitness 
expressing low confidence in his identification, making it very unreliable. Further, the jury heard 
expert testimony that under the circumstances surrounding Alleto’s death, the eyewitness had a poor 
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view of the defendant and would be unable to make an accurate identification. After the trial, the 
judge offered an opinion that an eyewitness is not always reliable and can be incorrect, as it was in this 
case. The judge also wrote that eyewitness evidence should not be completely convincing that the 
defendant committed the crime.  Therefore, the eyewitness testimony was key in Keller’s wrongful 
conviction.  
 
 
Fingerprint – Positive 
After a 10-day trial, Mark Hampton of Gary, Indiana, was convicted of first degree murder. A month 
after being reported missing by his son, the police found the body of Samuel Lithgow in a Gary, 
Indiana landfill. The police uncovered forensic evidence of Hampton’s involvement, and the state 
prosecutor charged Hampton with the crime. 
 
At trial, Hampton was convicted based primarily on his fingerprint being found on Lithgow’s body. 
The jury found the fingerprint to be very compelling evidence, because it was collected using 
standard methods, under pristine conditions, and analyzed by an experienced forensic examiner, 
leading to a very reliable match. Further, the jury heard expert testimony that fingerprints found on a 
body are rarely from someone other than the killer. After the trial, the judge offered an opinion that 
fingerprinting is reliable and is often correct, as it was in this case. The judge also wrote that a 
fingerprint match evidence should be very convincing that the defendant committed the crime. 
Therefore, Hampton’s fingerprint was key in making sure the right person was brought to justice. 
 
Fingerprint – Negative 
After a second trial, a judge overturned the conviction of Mark Hampton of Gary, Indiana. Previously, 
Hampton was wrongfully convicted of first degree murder based on improper evidence. A month 
after being reported missing by his son, the police found the body of Samuel Lithgow in a Gary, 
Indiana landfill. The police uncovered forensic evidence of Hampton’s involvement, and the state 
prosecutor charged Hampton with the crime. 
 
At trial, Hampton was convicted based primarily on his fingerprint being found on Lithgow’s body. 
The jury found the fingerprint to be very compelling evidence, despite it being collected using 
incorrect methods, under conditions that degraded the sample, and analyzed by a forensic examiner 
still in training, leading to an inaccurate match. Further, the jury heard expert testimony that 
fingerprints found on a body are often from someone other than the killer. After the trial, the judge 
offered an opinion that fingerprinting is not always reliable and can be incorrect, as it was in this case. 
The judge also wrote that a fingerprint should not be completely convincing that the defendant 
committed the crime. Therefore, Hampton’s fingerprint was key in his wrongful conviction. 
 
  
Filler Paragraphs 
1. 
Wally Taylor, at the age of 55, began experiencing extreme headaches, blackouts, migraines, and 
trouble concentrating. He first noticed these symptoms when he had trouble performing his job. 
After approximately two months of these symptoms, he was rushed to the hospital after blacking out 
at his daughter’s track meet. There, he met with a neurologist. 
 
During his hospital visit, Taylor’s neurologist ran a number of medical tests including MRI and CT 
scans. Taylor was kept in the hospital for one night for observation, but quickly released because 
preliminary tests showed no obvious cause for the blackouts. After another month of testing, the 
neurologist diagnosed Taylor with a small brain tumor. The neurologist concluded that because the 
tumor was so small, it was difficult to find on the brain scans. The neurologist also recommended that 
surgery would be extremely effective, as the tumor was so small and had not yet spread to any other 
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areas of the brain. With surgery and a short round of chemotherapy, Wally Taylor will likely make a 
remarkably fast and successful recovery. 
 
2. 
Gregory Sanford is a successful chef at a popular Minneapolis, MN steak restaurant. He has won many 
awards for his cooking abilities and received international recognition for his innovative recipes. 
Sanford was hired to his current job in 2012, after the restaurant’s owner read an article about 
Sanford and his creative fusion of Caribbean and Americana cuisine. 
 
This year, a high-profile business CEO hated one of Sanford’s new dishes and complained about the 
meal both on the internet and directly to the restaurant owner. The athlete complained that the meal 
was overcooked and not properly seasoned, and that the quality of the meat and vegetables in the 
meal was extremely low. The manager concluded that Sanford was at fault for the terrible meal, and 
fired him. The manager reasoned that Sanford should have paid extra care to the athlete’s meal. 
Further, Sanford is ultimately responsible for the quality of the food the restaurant orders, so if the 
food is low quality it is because Sanford was either cutting costs or not monitoring the orders. 
Although the owner provided Sanford severance pay, the owner has stated he would not recommend 
Sanford for any other jobs.  
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Appendix J 
Study 3b “Guilty” List Descriptives 
 
Item 
Type 
List Free Recall 
(SD) 
Recognition 
(SD) 
Confidence 
(SD) 
Remember 
(*) 
Know 
(*) 
Guess  
(*) 
Critical 
Lure 
Guilty .11 (.31) .61 (.49) 3.57 (1.18) 143 (.360) 132 
(.332) 
122 
(.307) 
Old Guilty 4.49 (1.40) .85 (.19) 3.28 (.47) 2.01 (.83) .39 (.67) .17 (.41) 
New Guilty .82 (1.37) .03 (.14) .02 (.19) .04 (.23) .04 (.25) 
Weak 
Lure 
Guilty - .37 (.48) 3.55 (1.21) 33 (.134) 86 (.351) 126 
(.514) 
Notes  
1. For Critical Lure and Weak Lure Free Recall and Recognition values, we report the 
proportion of participants that indicated they had seen the words on the list—either by 
including it in their Free Recall response, or by selecting “Old” in the Recognition Test. 
2. For Old and New Word Recognition, we report the mean number of those words 
categorized as “Old” on the recognition test. Thus, higher values for Old words indicate higher 
accuracy in categorization; a score of 1.0 would signify categorizing all Old words as “Old.” 
Conversely, lower values for New words indicate higher accuracy in categorization; a score of 
0 would signify categorizing all New words as “New.”  
*3. R/K/G for Critical Lure and Weak Lure, frequencies are reported (e.g., the number of 
participants who responded R/K/G) because participants could only respond with one value.  
4. The value in parentheses for Critical Lure and Weak Lure report the percentage of each 
response type within all “Old” responses. These values were not used for any inferential 
statistics. 
5. For R/K/G Old and New words, the recognition test contained three of each type (e.g., three 
old words, and three new words). Thus, we report the mean number of R responses, K 
responses, and G responses for each participant. Note that these values do not add up to 3 
because only participants who labeled a word as “Old” made a R/K/G judgment. 
*6. The value in parentheses for Old and New Words represents the standard deviation for 
each value.  
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Study 2 “Guilty” Placement Chi Square 
 
X2(24, N=72)=31.19, p=.148. (Overall Chi Square) 
  
Condition First Third Middle Third Last Third Total 
Control 0a 2a 7a 9 
Confession- 
Confession 
Confession+ 
0a 
0a 
0a 
1a 
3a 
0a 
5a 
1a 
5a 
6 
4 
5 
DNA- 
DNA 
DNA+ 
0a 
0a 
0a 
1a 
1a 
1a 
1a 
4a 
5a 
2 
5 
6 
Eyewitness- 
Eyewitness 
Eyewitness+ 
0a 
0a 
0a 
1a 
1a 
2a 
8a 
3a 
3a 
9 
4 
5 
Fingerprint- 
Fingerprint 
Fingerprint+ 
0a 
1a 
0a 
0a 
1a 
1a 
9a 
2a 
3a 
9 
4 
4 
Total 1 15 56 72 
Note: Matching superscript letters indicate categories whose column proportions do not differ 
significantly at p=.05 level.  
 
X2(4, N=72)=4.99, p=.288. (Priming Condition Chi Square) 
 
X2(8, N=72)=4.29, p=.830. (Evidence List Chi Square) 
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Appendix K 
Study 3b t-Tests and Alternate Analyses 
 
Free Recall 
 
List Prime Mean [95% CI] Positive-Negative comparison  
Control  .18 [.07, .28]    
Confession Neutral .08 [.00, .16]    
 Positive .10 [.01, .19] t(98)=0.32 p=.752 d=.06, [.00, .13] 
 Negative .12 [.03, .21]    
DNA Neutral .10 [.01, .18]    
 Positive .10 [.01, .19] t(98)=1.17 p=.244 d=.24, [.19, .29] 
 Negative .04 [-.02, .10]    
Eyewitness Neutral .06 [-.01, .13]    
 Positive .10 [.01, .19] t(98)=1.15 p=.253 d=.23, [.17, .30] 
 Negative .18 [.07, .29]    
Fingerprint Neutral .06 [-.01, .13]    
 Positive .08 [.00, .15] t(99)=1.53 p=.130 d=.30, [.24, .37] 
 Negative .18 [.09, .27]    
 
Recognition (Old/New) 
 
List Prime Mean [95% CI] Positive-Negative Comparison  
Control  .57 [.43, .71]    
Confession  Neutral .60 [.46, .74]    
 Positive .74 [.61, .87] t(98)=1.90 p=.060 d=.39, [.29, .48] 
 Negative .56 [.42, .70]    
DNA Neutral .67 [.53, .80]    
 Positive .62 [.48, .76] t(98)=0.61 p=.547 d=.12, [.02, .22] 
 Negative .56 [.42, .70]    
Eyewitness Neutral .56 [.42, .70]    
 Positive .60 [.46, .74] t(98)=0.80 p=.425 d=.16, [.07, .26] 
 Negative .52 [.38, .66]    
Fingerprint Neutral .65 [.51, .78]    
 Positive .61 [.47, .75] t(99)=0.33 p=.742 d=.06, [-.03, .16] 
 Negative .64 [.50, .78]    
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Confidence 
 
List Prime Mean [95% CI] Positive-Negative comparison  
Control  3.98 [3.67, 4.29]    
Confession Neutral 3.84 [3.56, 4.12]    
 Positive 3.44 [3.14, 3.74] t(98)=0.36 p=.719 d=.07, [-.14, .29] 
 Negative 3.52 [3.19, 3.85]    
DNA Neutral 3.49 [3.18, 3.81]    
 Positive 3.74 [3.40, 4.08] t(98)=1.55 p=.123 d=.31, [.09, .54] 
 Negative 3.38 [3.06, 3.70]    
Eyewitness Neutral 3.62 [3.27, 3.97]    
 Positive 3.32 [2.95, 3.69] t(98)=1.56 p=.122 d=.32, [.07, .56] 
 Negative 3.72 [3.37, 4.07]    
Fingerprint Neutral 3.41 [3.07, 3.75]    
 Positive 3.33 [2.96, 3.71] t(99)=1.20 p=.234 d=.24, [.01, .48] 
 Negative 3.62 [3.48, 3.66]    
 
 
Study 3b Free Recall Logistic Regression Alternate Analysis 
 
X2(4, N=654)=7.16, p=.306. 
Nagelkerke R2=.022 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
No Prime   3.503 2 .173    
Positive Prime .263 .361 .530 1 .467 1.301 .641 2.639 
Negative Prime .622 .341 3.328 1 .068 1.863 .955 3.637 
Control List   5.626 4 .229    
Confession -.978 .513 3.635 1 .057 .376 .138 1.028 
DNA -1.230 .529 5.411 1 .020 .292 .104 .824 
Eyewitness -.837 .505 2.747 1 .097 .433 .161 1.165 
Fingerprint -.918 .508 3.262 1 .071 .399 .147 1.081 
Constant -1.540 .367 17.588 1 .000 .214   
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Study 3b Recognition Test Logistic Regression Alternate Analysis 
 
X2(4, N=654)=4.82, p=.567. 
Nagelkerke R2=.010 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
No Prime   2.261 2 .323    
Positive Prime .099 .207 .230 1 .632 1.104 .736 1.656 
Negative Prime -.203 .204 .991 1 .320 .816 .548 1.217 
Control List   2.657 4 .617    
Confession .307 .351 .767 1 .381 1.359 .684 2.702 
DNA .232 .349 .441 1 .506 1.261 .636 2.501 
Eyewitness .000 .348 .000 1 .999 1.000 .506 1.979 
Fingerprint .298 .350 .727 1 .394 1.347 .679 2.675 
Constant .276 .283 .955 1 .329 1.318   
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Appendix L 
DRM Instructions and Memory Measures 
 
 DRM Primary Instructions: 
 
Instructions (Beginning of survey): For this task, we are going to have you read several [list 
of words]/[paragraphs] and ask you about them. Please do not write down anything from 
the [lists]/[paragraphs], take notes, etc. – instead, remember the [lists]/[paragraphs] as 
best you can. 
 
Instructions (List, Study 1a, 1b, and 3b): Now we are going to have you read a list of words. 
We want you to remember the words as best you can. When you ready to begin, press 
“Next” and click the arrow on the video to begin the video. 
 
Instructions (Story, Study 2a and 2b): Now, you will read a short paragraph. Again, please do 
not write down anything in the paragraph 
 
When you are ready to read the paragraph, proceed to the next page. You will have up to 
two minutes to read the paragraph, at which point you will be automatically advanced. 
 
Free Recall Test (Study 1a, 1b and Study 3b) 
 
Instructions: Now, we will test your memory for the list you just read. You will have 2 
minutes to enter as many words as you’re reasonably confident you saw on the list. After 2 
minutes, the survey will advance to the next part. 
 
[Participants are given 25 blanks to enter words they remember] 
 
 
 Free Recall Test (Study 2a and 2b) 
Instructions: Below, please recall the paragraph as accurately as you can. To the best of 
your ability, replicate the paragraph word-for-word, or as closely as you can. 
 
[Participants are given an Essay Text Box to enter their response] 
 
  
Recognition Test 
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(continued on next page) 
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(continued on next page)  
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Participants are then presented with the following words: 
 
Judge2 Zebra3 
Balance3 Blossom3 
Court2 Develop3 
Criminal2 Castle3 
Guilty1 Jury2 
Trial2 Punishment4 
Elevator3  
  
Note: Order of words on the memory test was randomized, but the same across 
participants.  
 
Key: 
1 Critical Lure 
2 Old Word (word presented on the list) 
3 New Word (random word, not on the list) 
4 Weakly Associated Lure (the 15th word from our backwards association task; used as a 
theme-relevant control) 
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